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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many nonprofit organizations are governed by boards of directors 
comprised of individuals who often have been invited to join the board 
based on their contributions of time and money. For many, this is either 
their first board membership or yet another conducted within an 
environment lacking the experience and structure of board governance 
typically found in a publicly-traded corporation. Accordingly, governance 
of many nonprofit enterprises presents both similarities to and differences 
from the governance of a for-profit entity. 
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How is nonprofit governance different from that conducted in for-
profit organizations? How do you build the best board for your nonprofit? 
What attributes and skills are required by law and what mix of experiences 
and talents will give you the best result? What are the commonly required 
director attributes that are a must for each board, and how do you 
customize and fine-tune your efforts to achieve a high-performance 
board? Optimal board composition—achieving the best mix of director 
skills and experience—will depend on many enterprise-specific 
variables.1 Some of the most important of these for nonprofits include, but 
are not limited to: (1) enterprise lifecycle stage, (2) extent to which certain 
experiences and skills are mission critical (detailed understanding of 
target culture, mission, stake-holder composition, and risk); (3) unique 
technology dependence (social media); and (4) the need for capacity 
expansion (fundraising).2 Our goal in writing this paper is to provide the 
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The authors wish to extend particular thanks to the following for their assistance in the research and 
preparation of this article: Deborah Cannon, Sharon Foster; Peter Gleason, Jack Lowe, Dennis 
McCuistion; Stephen Newton; Peter C. Ormerod; and Becky White. All errors and omissions are our 
own.1. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 
55 VAND. L. REV. 1–55 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Smith v. Van Gorkom (UCLA School of 
Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 08-13, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130972 
[https://perma.cc/6WA2-JXKU]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance and U.S. Capital 
Market Competitiveness (UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 10-13, 2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1696303 [https://perma.cc/GXJ6-YB6H]; Renee Adams, Benjamin E. 
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A 
Conceptual Framework and Survey (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 
14486, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14486 [https://perma.cc/229Q-LWXK]; Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, Joseph E. Bachelder, Roel C. Campos, Byron S. Georgiou, Alan G. Hevesi, William Lerach, 
Robert Mendelsohn, Robert A.G. Monks, Toby Myerson, John F. Olson, Leo E. Strine Jr. & John C. 
Wilcox, Director Liability, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. No. 3, 1011–45 (2006) (presenting an excellent 
discussion of post Sarbanes-Oxley director liability from the edited transcript of a forum on personal 
liability of directors held at Harvard Law School in November 2005.); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma 
Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22(2) REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009); 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Michael S. Weisbach, The State of Corporate Governance Research, 23 REV. 
FIN. STUD. NO. 3, 939–61 (2010); Jay Dahya & John J. McConnell, Outside Directors and Corporate 
Board Decisions: A Natural Experiment (2001), AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=354380 [https://perma.cc/8DKV-UCPJ]. 
2. See e.g., Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Mark E. Evans & Dhananjay Nanda, Nonprofit Boards: Size, 
Performance, and Managerial Incentives, 53(1) J. ACCT. & ECON. 466 (2012); Ellen P. Aprill, What 
Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About Regulation of Nonprofit Governance, 76(2) FORDHAM 
L. REV. 765 (2007); Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate 
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following: answers to these basic questions; a roadmap for the nonprofit 
enterprise faced with recruiting a board; a matrix methodology that every 
nominating committee and board can employ to systematically inventory 
their people, assets, strengths and weaknesses, define their needs, and 
explore their options; and provoke radical thinking about how any 
Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701 
(2008); Kathleen M. Boozang, Does an Independent Board Improve Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance? (Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper No. 1002421, 2007), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1002421 [https://perma.cc/WJ6Y-ERM6]; L. David Brown, Sanjeev 
Khagram, Mark H. Moore & Peter Frumkin, Globalization, Ngos and Multi-Sectoral Relations 
(2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=253110 [https://perma.cc/X9FY-8EXH]; L. David Brown, Jane G. 
Covey & Mark Leach, Organization Development for Social Change, in HANDBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT (2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=622244 [https://perma.cc/P45X-
AEVC]; Nicholas Donatiello, David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, What Can For-Profit and Nonprofit 
Boards Learn from Each Other About Improving Governance? (Stanford University Graduate School 
of Business Research Paper No. 15-28, 2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-
research/publications/what-can-profit-nonprofit-boards-learn-each-other-about-improving 
[https://perma.cc/6BZV-GVKN]; Brian D. Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs it?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 
(2013); Brian D. Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1213 (2010); Erica Harris, 
Christine Petrovits & Michelle Yetman, The Effect of Nonprofit Governance on Donations: Evidence 
from the Revised Form 990, 90(2) ACCT. REV. 579 (2014); Henry Hansmann & Reinier H. Kraakman, 
The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa 
Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit 
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14(2) U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347 (2012); Bernd Helmig, Marc Jegers & Irvine 
Lapsley, Challenges in Managing Nonprofit Organizations: A Research Overview, 15 INT’L J. VOL. 
& NONPROFIT ORGANS. 101 (2004); Klaus J. Hopt, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Some 
Corporate Governance Thoughts from Europe (Euro. Corp. Gov. Inst.—Law Working Paper No. 
125/2009, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1425670 [https://perma.cc/Q5EC-5B69]; Jill R. Horwitz, 
Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 YALE J. REG. 140 (2007); Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of 
Philanthrocapitalism?, 61(3) CASE W. RES. L. REV. (2011); Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role 
of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59 (2010); Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds? 
Groupthink and Nonprofit Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179 (2010); Christine W. Letts, Effective 
Foundation Boards: The Importance of Roles (KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-054, 
2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=642562 [https://perma.cc/UQ9Y-SUTX]; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & 
Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the 21st Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85(2) 
CHI-KENT L. REV. 479 (2010); Ira M. Millstein, Katherine M. O’Regan & Sharon M. Oster, 
Governance Practices Among Nonprofit Organizations Contracting with New York City (Yale SOM 
Working Paper No. PM-02, 2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=244412 [https://perma.cc/Q3K9-STTF]; 
Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose is Not Good for the Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley-Style 
Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981 (2007); J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose 
with Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited 
Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. (2011); Michael F. Murray, Private Management of Public 
Spaces: Nonprofit Organizations and Urban Parks, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179 (2010); Katherine 
M. O’Regan & Sharon M. Oster, Does Government Funding Alter Nonprofit Governance? Evidence 
from New York City Nonprofit Contractors (Yale SOM Working Paper No. PM-03, 2001), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=279310 [https://perma.cc/HTE9-YVXN]; Antony Page & Robert Katz, Is 
Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (2011); Dana 
Brakman Reiser, Regulating Social Enterprise, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 231 (2014); Usha Rodrigues, 
Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257 (2011).  
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enterprise-specific system of governance may be improved by questioning 
existing fundamental assumptions. 
Our article proceeds in six parts. First, we offer a few thoughts about 
nonprofits, their various missions, and common challenges nonprofits 
face. Second, we discuss why good governance is important in a nonprofit 
setting and highlight examples of frauds that have been reported due to 
the absence of good governance. Third, we present a look at Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) requirements imposed on nonprofits. Fourth, we 
explore the law of nonprofit corporate governance applicable to all 
directors serving on the board of a nonprofit. Fifth, we discuss board 
composition and committee structure. Sixth, we present a process that 
involves an inventory of current board strengths and weaknesses and then 
offer some thoughts about use of a matrix template to assist in discovering 
necessary board skills and experiences of board candidates. 
The search for optimal board composition is not set out in a vacuum; 
rather, it is based on a clear prejudice by the authors that all current 
enterprise operations should be a part of and based upon articulated 
organizational strategy that is headed somewhere with purpose and clearly 
communicated to all involved. Hopefully, constructive thinking about 
board composition, succession planning, and a productive dialogue 
among all board members will result. 
II. NONPROFITS ARE DIFFERENT
Many board members of nonprofit organizations serve because they 
believe in the mission of the enterprise, whether it is housing and feeding 
the homeless, finding a cure for cancer, or any of the numerous causes 
that seek to make our world a better place. Often nonprofit directors are 
recruited after they have shown financial support for the organization. 
Unlike in most for-profit settings, it is not unusual for board directors in a 
nonprofit environment to have little or no prior experience in corporate 
governance before joining the board. This creates a special need to on-
board new nonprofit directors by providing basic or continuing education 
regarding legal responsibilities germane to the fiduciary duties of 
directorship. 
According to Forbes, the 100 largest U.S. charities, “together 
received $49 billion in gifts, a whopping 12% of the $410 billion taken in 
by the country’s 1 million-plus nonprofits.”3 The Washington Post 
reports: “More than 1.6 million nonprofit groups are registered with the 
3. William P. Barrett, ed., America’s Top Charities 2018, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/top-charities/#42859eb676ab [https://perma.cc/3MYH-HHHF]. 
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federal government, and they control more than $4.5 trillion in assets. An 
additional 700,000 organizations, such as churches and smaller groups, 
need not register.”4 Exhibit 1 provides a listing of the Top 10 U.S. 
charities ranked by private support. 
Exhibit 1 
Top Ten 2018 U.S. Charities Ranked by Private Support5 
Rank Name 
Private 
Support 
Donor 
Dependency 
1 United Way Worldwide $3.471 B 100% 
2 Feeding America $2.654 B 99% 
3 Americares Foundation  $2.379 B 81% 
4 Task Force for Global Health $2.161 B 101% 
5 Salvation Army $2.033B 69% 
6 St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital $1.511 B 57% 
7 Direct Relief $1.238 B 101% 
8 Habitat for Humanity International $1.095 B 94% 
9 Boys & Girls Clubs of America $989 M 80% 
10 YMCA of the USA $974 M 55% 
Source: Forbes 
A. The Business of Philanthropy 
Philanthropy is a business, and just like other businesses, it has 
finance, marketing, accounting, auditing, and operational challenges. 
However, unlike an electronic component manufacturer, many nonprofit 
and philanthropic enterprises have laser-like focus on raising and 
investing monies necessary to fund operations and making every dollar 
count. Yet, how is it in a world of unimaginable productivity and affluence 
4. See Joe Stephens & Mary Pat Flaherty, Inside the hidden world of thefts, scams and
phantom purchases at the nation’s nonprofits, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/inside-the-hidden-world-of-thefts-scams-and-
phantom-purchases-at-the-nations-nonprofits/2013/10/26/825a82ca-0c26-11e3-9941-
6711ed662e71_story.html?utm_term=.492b8c444037 [https://perma.cc/TE9C-9EK3]. 
5. The 100 Largest U.S. Charities, FORBES (2018), https://www.forbes.com/top-charities/list/ 
[https://perma.cc/FVC3-SWDA].  
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that we still have “the persistence of poverty and need, of disease and 
suffering”?6 Dan Pallotta writes: 
We give money to charities because we do want progress. We want 
things to change, not stay the same. Somewhere in the depths of our 
hearts we have a desire to make a difference. We all want our lives to 
matter. In an often dreary world, each dollar we give is a sign that we 
have not yet lost hope. In the midst of our busy lives, each contribution 
is a sign that we have not forgotten about all those who live in poverty, 
despair, and abandonment. Out of this basic charity inside of us has 
grown a charity outside of us—a multibillion-dollar industry employing 
millions of people who work to turn our contributions into positive 
change. We put our trust not just in individual charities, but in the system 
of charity itself to take our offerings and make of them a better world.7 
B. Common Challenges of NonProfit Governance 
Jack Lowe of Dallas, Texas was the recipient of the 2012 Lifetime 
Achievement Award from the National Association of Corporate 
Directors (NACD).8 His many contributions to his community exceed the 
space limitation of this article. However, in brief, Jack Lowe is a former 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Zale Corporation; a former 
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of TDIndustries (a national 
mechanical, electrical, and plumbing construction and facility service 
company); director of Drew Industries Incorporated; and former director 
of KDC Holdings, LLC (a private real estate development and investment 
firm). 
In his career, Jack has been active in many civic and industry 
organizations, including serving on the boards of the Dallas Citizens 
Council, Salesmanship Club of Dallas, United Way of Metropolitan 
Dallas, Better Business Bureau of Metropolitan Dallas, Dallas Zoological 
Society, the advisory council of the Communities Foundation of Texas, 
Quality Texas Foundation, Texas Business and Education Coalition, and 
the Senior Citizens of Greater Dallas. His past community service 
includes serving on the boards of the Dallas Chapter of the American Red 
Cross, Center for Nonprofit Management, Cotton Bowl Athletic 
Association, Dallas County Community College District Foundation, 
Greater Dallas Chamber of Commerce, and Construction Education 
6. See DAN PALLOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: HOW RESTRAINTS ON NONPROFITS UNDERMINE 
THEIR POTENTIAL xi (2008). 
7. Id. at 4. 
8. NACD DIRECTORSHIP 100, NACD B. Kenneth West Lifetime Achievement Award (2012), 
https://www.nacdonline.org/directorship100/2012honorees.cfm [https://perma.cc/3HTQ-SLMU]. 
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Foundation. He is the past president of the Dallas Alliance, and the 
Community Council of Greater Dallas. He served for many years on the 
Board of Trustees of the Dallas Independent School District and as its 
president. He has been the Business Co-chair of the Texas Business and 
Education Coalition and on the board of the Center for the Reform of 
School Systems since 2000. He continues to chair the board of the 
Greenleaf Center for Servant Leadership. Jack Lowe believes that 
common challenges facing most nonprofit boards include that: “often 
non-profit board members have little or no preparation for board service 
and do not understand what they should and should not do as a board 
member.”9 Of particular importance, “Today’s fast changing world 
requires non-profit boards to assure the organization has an annually 
updated strategic plan and succession plan.”10 
Dennis McCuistion is Clinical Professor of Corporate Governance at 
the University of Texas at Dallas where he also serves as Executive 
Director of the Institute for Excellence in Corporate Governance. He 
heads the Institute’s conferences, in-house programs, and events. He is a 
long-time member of the National Association of Corporate Directors 
(NACD). He holds NACD’s Governance Fellow designation and is a 
faculty member for the NACD’s Board Advisory Services. In addition to 
his own financial consulting firm, McCuistion & Associates, Inc., he is a 
former bank CEO, and has served on over a dozen private, public, and 
not-for-profit boards, including serving as Chairman of the Board and 
Lead Independent Director. 
Professor McCuistion states that major challenges to nonprofits 
include “that there are too many of them and consolidation is needed. 
Additionally, boards are still uneducated as to what their real roles and 
duties are ̶ so strategy is underdeveloped and succession of executive 
directors and boards is inadequate. Consistent revenue streams, not just 
annual ‘begs’ are also needed.”11 When asked: what is different today 
from nonprofit governance five years ago, professor McCuistion says “the 
good news is that more director accountability is happening, more 
nonprofits are changing from founders to true leaders, and there are more 
9. See e-mail from Jack Lowe, Corp. Dir., to Lawrence J. Trautman (Feb. 21, 2018, 13:59
EST) (on file with authors). 
10. Id. 
11. See e-mail from Dennis McCuistion, Clinical Professor of Corp. Governance, University
of Texas at Dallas; Executive Dir., Institute for Excellence in Corporate Governance, to Lawrence J. 
Trautman (Jan. 21, 2018, 11:24 EST) (on file with authors). 
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metrics being used to truly measure results instead of just counting people 
served for example.”12 
Deborah Cannon of Houston has served on at least sixteen nonprofit 
boards including: United Way of Texas Gulf Coast, YMCA of Greater 
Houston, Houston Technology Center, St. Luke’s Episcopal Health 
Charities, and Irving Healthcare System. Some boards she has chaired 
include: the Visiting Nurses Association, Greater Houston Partnership, 
Women’s Business Enterprise National Council and Memorial Hermann 
Health System. Ms. Cannon believes, “Major challenges include the need 
to build consensus among the staff, most of whom work for nonprofits 
because they believe in the mission. They are typically slower to realize 
the need for change and require a lot of time and effort to build consensus 
for actions needed.”13 
C. No Money  ̶  No Mission 
For-profit organizations exist to sell a product or service, and their 
revenue streams are often subject to a product life cycle. As demonstrated 
vividly in Exhibit 1, except for enterprises that are fully financially-
endowed, nonprofit organizations differ in that their revenue stream is 
dependent almost entirely upon donations.14 Therefore, a major focus—if 
not the major focus of almost every nonprofit enterprise—is the raising 
and preservation of capital necessary to accomplish its stated mission. 
12. Id. 
13. See e-mail from Deborah Cannon, Corp. & Nonprofit Dir., to Lawrence J. Trautman (Jan. 
26, 2018) (on file with authors). 
14. See e.g., Peter Frumkin & Mark T. Kim, Strategic Positioning and the Financing of
Nonprofit Organizations: Is Efficiency Rewarded in the Contributions Marketplace?, Hauser Center 
for Nonprofit Org. (Working Paper No. 2, 2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=253115 
[https://perma.cc/WF6D-PY52]; Peter Dobkin Hall, Philanthropy, the Welfare State, and the 
Transformation of American Public and Private Institutions, 1945–2000, Hauser Center for Nonprofit 
Org. (Working Paper No. 5, 2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=262652 [https://perma.cc/9TFV-
XUN4]; Russell N. James, Cash Is Not King for Fundraising: Gifts of Noncash Assets Predict 
Contributions Growth, 29(5-6) NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP (2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3126983 [https://perma.cc/47QZ-4YYB]; Michele Margolis & Michael 
Sances, Who Really Gives? Partisanship and Charitable Giving in the United States (2013), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2148033 [https://perma.cc/LDH4-JS9X]; David E. Pozen, Remapping the 
Charitable Deduction, 39 CONN. L. REV. 531 (2006); Norman I. Silber & Ely R. Levy, Nonprofit 
Fundraising and Consumer Protection: A Donor’s Right to Privacy, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 519 
(2004); Reid K. Weisbord & Peter DeScioli, The Effects of Donor Standing on Philanthropy: Insights 
from the Psychology of Gift-Giving, 45(2) GONZ. L. REV. 225 (2010); Xue Tan, Yingda Lu & Yong 
Tan, Why Should I Donate? Examining the Effects of Reputation, Peer Influence, and Popularity on 
Charitable Giving Over Social Media Platforms (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820219 
[https://perma.cc/35KW-SLWG]. 
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Within the nonprofit universe, this revenue focus is often referred to as 
capacity expansion.15 After all, no money—no mission! 
III. WHY GOOD GOVERNANCE IS IMPORTANT
A. Fraud and Poor Governance at Nonprofits 
Fraud is defined as “1. A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or 
concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her 
detriment. . . . 2. A misrepresentation made recklessly without belief in its 
truth to induce another person to act. 3. A tort . . . . 4. Unconscionable 
dealing . . . .”16 A 2006 study reports that “many people have potential 
access to nonprofit revenues and assets since nine percent of all workers 
are employed within the sector . . . and an estimated 65 million adults 
provide volunteer services each year.”17 Furthermore, “media reports 
suggest the level of fraud might be extensive. For example, the FBI 
reported that more than two thousand of the internet sites soliciting relief 
for Hurricane Katrina victims were fraudulent.”18 Professors Greenlee, 
Fischer, Gordon and Keating offer the following examples of how fraud 
often presents in a nonprofit setting: 
• Occupational fraud, e.g., a nonprofit employee overcharges his
or her employer for travel expenses or steals cash from the bank
account.
15. See e.g., Darrene Hackler & Gregory D. Saxton, The Strategic Use of Information
Technology by Nonprofit Organizations: Increasing Capacity and Untapped Potential, 67(3) Pub. 
Admin. Rev. No. 3, 474-487 (2007), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1742466 [https://perma.cc/GN8Y-
NJQW]; Elizabeth K. Keating, Mary Fischer, Teresa P. Gordon & Janet S. Greenlee, Assessing 
Financial Vulnerability in the Nonprofit Sector, KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-002, Hauser Center 
for Nonprofit Organizations Paper No. 27 (2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=647662 
[https://perma.cc/JFS4-35BY]; Claudio Travaglini, Financial Statement Analysis in Nonprofit 
Organizations (2005), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1079380 [https://perma.cc/4KPG-5YDU]; Burton 
A. Weisbrod, The Future of the Nonprofit Sector: Its Entwining with Private Enterprise and 
Government, 16(4) J. POL’Y ANALS. & MGMT. 541 (1997), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1850797 
[https://perma.cc/S2YL-L4ZB]; John Zietlow, A Financial Health Index for Achieving Nonprofit 
Financial Sustainability (2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2049022[https://perma.cc/89HF-F2ET].  
16. Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ( 3d Pocket ed., 2006). 
17. Janet Greenlee, Mary Fischer, Teresa Gordon & Elizabeth Keating, An Investigation of
Fraud in Nonprofit Organizations: Occurrences and Deterrents, Harv. U: Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit 
Organizations, (Working Paper No. 35, 2006), https://webworks.typepad.com/
lakecountyfiscalrangers/files/nonprofit_fraud_keating_35pgs.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9BB-XCU8]. 
18. Id. at 3. 
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• Consumer fraud, e.g., an attendee at a fund raising auction
replaces the price tag on an item with the goal of purchasing it
at a lower price.
• Insurance fraud, e.g., a nonprofit policy holder falsely claims
its van or car has been stolen with the goal of collecting the
value of the “stolen” vehicle in cash.
• Medicare fraud, e.g. a nonprofit healthcare worker “codes”
services rendered with the goal of increasing Medicare
reimbursement to the organization.19
Occupational fraud may be further dissected into “fraud against the 
organization (such as the misappropriation of cash or other assets, or the 
use of one’s position to benefit one’s self or others) and fraud by the 
organization against its ‘owners’ or stakeholders (such as misstating 
financial statements).”20 Instances of fraud and reputational crisis among 
nonprofits are legion.21 Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon and Keating report that 
a 2005 “survey conducted by the Association of Certified Fraud 
Examiners (ACFE) estimates that all organizations lose on average six 
percent of their revenue to fraud every year. Applying this percentage to 
the nonprofit sector would suggest that the fraud loss would be 
approximately $40 billion each year.”22 Although nonprofits do not have 
the imposed discipline of stringent reporting requirements such as those 
imposed upon publicly held corporate securities issuers by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), directors of nonprofit organizations 
still have the threat of individual, joint, and several legal liability for their 
actions or failure to act. During October 2013, The Washington Post 
reported their examination of nonprofit entity disclosures required on 
federal forms about “whether [the nonprofit entity] had experienced an 
embezzlement or other ‘diversion’ of its assets.”23 This Washington Post 
analysis of these disclosures covering the period 2008 to 2012 indicated 
19. Id. at 5–6. 
20. Id. at 6. 
21. See Ann E. Marimow, Ex-chief of pathology nonprofit gets 4 years for stealing from
organization, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/ex-
chief-of-pathology-nonprofit-gets-4-years-for-stealing-from-organization/2016/01/29/8888a530-
c6c0-11e5-a4aa-f25866ba0dc6_story.html?utm_term=.c2175f1743b4 [https://perma.cc/Z9WF-
WFER]; Valerie Strauss, Report: Millions of dollars in fraud, waste found in charter school sector, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2015/04/28/
report-millions-of-dollars-in-fraud-waste-found-in-charter-school-sector/?utm_term=.31d41aec7647 
[https://perma.cc/6BXX-62CQ]. 
22. Greenlee, supra note 17 at 5. 
23. See Stephens & Flaherty, supra note 4. 
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“more than 1,000 nonprofit organizations . . . checked the box indicating 
that they had discovered a ‘significant diversion’ of assets, disclosing 
losses attributed to theft, investment fraud, embezzlement and other 
unauthorized uses of funds.”24 The Washington Post further observes: 
Just 10 of the largest disclosures identified by The Post cited combined 
losses to nonprofit groups and their affiliates that potentially totaled 
more than a half-billion dollars. 
While some of the diversions have come to public attention, many 
others . . . have not been reported in the news media. And The Post 
found that nonprofits routinely omitted important details from their 
public filings, leaving the public to guess what had happened—even 
though federal disclosure instructions direct nonprofit groups to explain 
the circumstances. About half the organizations did not disclose the total 
amount lost. 
The findings are striking because organizations are required to report 
only diversions of more than $250,000 or those identified as having 
exceeded 5 percent of an organization’s annual gross receipts or total 
assets. Of those, filing instructions direct nonprofits to disclose “any 
unauthorized conversion or use of the organization’s assets other than 
for the organization’s authorized purposes, including but not limited to 
embezzlement or theft.”25 
The Washington Post provides the following list of nonprofit 
embezzlements or other reported diversions of assets: 
• [The American Legacy Foundation] “became aware” of a
diversion “in excess of $250,000 committed by a former
employee.” . . . Records and interviews reveal the full story: an
estimated $3.4 million loss, linked to purchases from a business
described sometimes as a computer supply firm and at others
as a barbershop, and to an assistant vice president who now
runs a video game emporium in Nigeria.
• [T]he nonprofit Youth Service America reported two years ago
that it discovered a diversion in 2009 of about $2 million that
had been “misappropriated” by a former employee. After The
Post asked about the incident, he was charged in federal court
and in June was sentenced to four years in prison for theft.
24. See Stephens & Flaherty, supra note 4. 
25. See Stephens & Flaherty, supra note 4. 
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• AARP, the national charity that advocates for older
Americans . . . [in 2011] disclosed two incidents with losses
totaling more than $230,000, attributed to embezzlement and
billing irregularities.
• [T]he Maryland Legal Aid Bureau . . . disclosed two years ago
that a former finance director and an accomplice had been
convicted of making off with $1.1 million; officials there said
in interviews they now think the total loss was closer to $2.5
million.
• The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,
based in Geneva but regulated and largely financed in the
United States, reported in 2012 that it had found evidence of
misuse or unsubstantiated spending of $43 million in grant
funds.
• The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany,
a New York-based charity for Holocaust survivors, reported in
2010 that it had been bilked out of $42 million in an elaborate,
decade-long conspiracy by swindlers who created thousands of
fake identities. A spokesman said the estimate has since been
raised to $60 million.26
The following are just a few examples of sub-standard nonprofit 
governance to make our point. 
B. Toronto Salvation Army 
Professor Richard Leblanc reports that the executive director at the 
Toronto Salvation Army operation is alleged to have been involved in a 
“massive theft of $2M in children’s toys . . . [which] likely involved 
inadequate internal controls over the segregation of duties, over the 
safeguarding of assets, and over restricted areas. Perhaps paper rather than 
IT controls were being used (still not uncommon), which is more capable 
of manual override.”27 Professor Leblanc continues: 
It is unclear, judging from the Salvation Army website, whether the 
Governing Council of the Salvation Army has adequate independence 
from management or financial expertise. . . . There is an advisory board, 
26. See Stephens & Flaherty, supra note 4.
27. Richard Leblanc, Governance at the Salvation Army, DR. RICHARD LEBLANC 
GOVERNANCE BLOG: EMERGENT DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARY ON GOVERNANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY (Nov. 27, 2012), http://rleblanc.apps01.yorku.ca/governance-at-the-salvation-
army/ [https://perma.cc/F95L-GBJB]. 
13
Trautman and Ford: Nonprofit Governance: The Basics
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
984 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:971 
but there is no indication that the Salvation Army has a proper, 
functioning board of directors, that oversees risk and controls. Advisory 
committees advise, but cannot direct.28 
C. Penn State Sex Abuse Scandal 
Years after a scathing report was issued by Special Investigative 
Counsel Louis Freeh regarding “the culpability of Pennsylvania State 
University administrators in the Jerry Sandusky child-molestation 
scandal,” the issue is still in the news.29 Following guilty pleas to child 
endangerment charges by Penn State’s former athletic director and a 
university senior vice president, and just hours after Graham B. Spanier, 
former Penn State president, was convicted of one count of misdemeanor 
endangering the welfare of children, Mr. Freeh observed: 
For over 12 years, these men actively protected a notorious pedophile 
who inflicted irreparable harm on countless child victims on the 
campuses and locker rooms at PSU . . . Although these men had 
multiple opportunities to stop this vicious, serial predator from 
continuing to sexually assault children who trusted the PSU campuses 
and programs as safe havens, they decided together to protect this 
monster rather than report him to the police. . . . 
Barron and a coterie of ‘Paterno denier’ board members, alumni, cultlike 
groups such as Penn Staters for Responsible Stewardship, a former 
professional football player, and certain elected state political hacks 
have been nothing but apologists for Paterno, Spanier, Schultz, and 
Curley, more concerned about bringing back a bronze statue than 
worrying about the multiple child victims who have forever been so 
grievously harmed on the PSU campus.30 
1. Background
The 267-page Report dated July 12, 2012 by the Investigative 
Counsel of law firm Freeh, Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP is a must read for all 
those considering nonprofit directorship.31 Because of the many important 
28. Id. 
29. Don Troop, Louis Freeh Savages Penn State’s Leaders and Calls for Its President to
Resign, CHRONS. HIGHER EDUC. (2017), https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/ticker/louis-freeh-
savages-penn-states-leaders-and-calls-for-its-president-to-resign/117422 [https://perma.cc/W9TF-
FDD]. 
30. Id. 
31. See Report of the Special Investigative Counsel Regarding the Actions of The Pennsylvania 
State University Related to the Child Sexual Abuse Committed by Gerald A. Sandusky, Freeh Sporkin 
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governance lessons this tragedy teaches, we offer the following excerpts 
from the Report’s Executive Summary for serious thought and reflection: 
On November 4, 2011 the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania (“Attorney General”) filed criminal charges against 
Gerald A. Sandusky (“Sandusky”) that included multiple counts of 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated indecent assault, 
corruption of minors, unlawful contact with minors and endangering the 
welfare of minors. Several of the offenses occurred between 1998 and 
2002, during which time Sandusky was either the Defensive Coordinator 
for The Pennsylvania State University . . .  football team or a Penn State 
professor Emeritus with unrestricted access to the University’s football 
facilities. On November 4, 2011, the Attorney General filed criminal 
charges against the University’s Athletic Director (“AD”) Timothy M. 
Curley (“Curley”) and Senior Vice President Finance and Business 
(“SVP-FB”), Gary C. Schultz (“Schultz”) for failing to report 
allegations of child abuse against Sandusky to law enforcement or child 
protection authorities in [2001] and for committing perjury during their 
testimony about the allegations to the Grand Jury in Dauphin County, 
Pennsylvania, in January 2011. 
On June 22, 2012, a Centre County jury in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania 
found Sandusky guilty of 45 counts of the criminal charges against him. 
As of the date of this report, the charges against Curley and Schultz have 
not been heard by the court. 
The criminal charges filed against these highly respected University and 
community leaders are unprecedented in the history of the University. 
Several senior University leaders who had knowledge of the allegations 
did not prepare for the possibility that these criminal charges would be 
filed. In the days and weeks surrounding the announcement of the 
charges, University leaders . . . and the University’s Board of Trustees 
(“Board” or “Trustees”), struggled to decide what actions the University 
should take and how to be appropriately transparent about their actions. 
The high degree of interest exhibited by members of the University 
community, alumni, the public and the national media put additional 
pressure on these leaders to act quickly.32 
2. Findings
The findings from the Report of the Sandusky Special Investigative 
Counsel constitute an important case study in governance failure. While 
& Sullivan, LLP (July 12, 2012), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/396518/freeh-report-
into-penn-state-university.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBP3-DZTD]. 
32. Id. 
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reading and reflecting upon the entire document is highly recommended, 
space limitations confine us here to a brief synopsis: 
The most saddening finding by the Special Investigative Counsel is the 
total and consistent disregard by the most senior leaders at Penn State 
for the safety and welfare of Sandusky’s child victims. As the Grand 
Jury similarly noted in its presentment, there was no “attempt to 
investigate, to identify Victim 2, or to protect that child or any others 
from similar conduct except as related to preventing its re-occurrence on 
University property.” 
Four of the most powerful people at The Pennsylvania State 
University—President Graham B. Spanier, Senior Vice President-
Finance and Business Gary C. Schultz, Athletic Director Timothy M. 
Curley and Head Football Coach Joseph V. Paterno—failed to protect 
against a child sexual predator harming children for over a decade. 
These men concealed Sandusky’s activities from the Board of Trustees, 
the University community and authorities. They exhibited a striking lack 
of empathy for Sandusky’s victims by failing to inquire as to their safety 
and well-being, especially by not attempting to determine the identity of 
the child who Sandusky assaulted in the Lasch building in 2001. Further, 
they exposed this child to additional harm by alerting Sandusky, who 
was the only one who knew the child’s identity, of what McQueary saw 
in the shower on the night of February 9, 2001. 
These individuals, unchecked by the Board of Trustees that did not 
perform its oversight duties, empowered Sandusky to attract potential 
victims to the campus and football events by allowing him to have 
continued, unrestricted and unsupervised access to the University’s 
facilities and affiliation with the University’s prominent football 
program. Indeed, that continued access provided Sandusky with the very 
currency that enabled him to attract his victims. Some coaches, 
administrators and football program staff members ignored the red flags 
of Sandusky’s behaviors and no one warned the public about him. 
By not promptly and fully advising the Board of Trustees about the 1998 
and 2001 child sexual abuse allegations against Sandusky and the 
subsequent Grand Jury investigation of him, Spanier failed in his duties 
as President. The Board also failed in its duties to oversee the President 
and senior University officials in 1998 and 2001 by not inquiring about 
important University matters and by not creating an environment where 
senior University officials felt accountable. 
Once the Board was made aware of the investigations of Sandusky and 
the fact that senior University officials had testified before the Grand 
Jury in the investigations, it should have recognized the potential risk to 
16
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the University community and to the University’s reputation. Instead, 
the Board, as a governing body, failed to inquire reasonably and to 
demand detailed information from Spanier. The Board’s overconfidence 
in Spanier’s abilities to deal with the crisis, and its complacent attitude 
left them unprepared to respond to the November 2011 criminal charges 
filed against two senior Penn State leaders and a former prominent 
coach. Finally, the Board’s subsequent removal of Paterno as head 
football coach was poorly handled, as were the Board’s communications 
with the public. . . [T]he Special Investigative Counsel finds that it is 
more reasonable to conclude that, in order to avoid the consequences of 
bad publicity, the most powerful leaders at the University—Spanier, 
Schultz, Paterno and Curley—repeatedly concealed critical facts 
relating to Sandusky’s child abuse from the authorities, the University’s 
Board of Trustees, the Penn State community, and the public at large. 
The avoidance of the consequences of bad publicity is the most 
significant, but not the only, cause for this failure to protect child victims 
and report to authorities. The investigation also revealed: 
• A striking lack of empathy for child abuse victims by the most
senior leaders of the University.
• A failure by the Board to exercise its oversight functions in
1998 and 2001 by not having regular reporting procedures or
committee structures in place to ensure disclosure to the Board
of major risks to the University.
• A failure by the Board to make reasonable inquiry in 2011 by
not demanding details from Spanier and the General Counsel
about the nature and direction of the grand jury investigation
and the University’s response to the investigation.
• A President who discouraged discussion and dissent.
• A lack of awareness of child abuse issues, the Clery Act, and
whistleblower policies and protections.33
3. Alarming Prevalence of Sexual Assault
Other examples of widespread sexual abuse, assault, and sexual 
harassment are reported seemingly daily.34 For example, press reports 
33. Id. (emphasis added). 
34. See Melissa Korn, Academia Faces a #MeToo Moment, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 12, 2018), at
A3 (college campuses); Ryan Dube & Francis X. Rocca, Clerical Sex-Abuse Scandal Follows Pope, 
WALL ST. J., (Jan. 16, 2018), at A16 (Catholic church); Blake Ellis & Melanie Hicken, Sick, Dying 
and Raped in America’s Nursing Homes, CNN (2017), http://www.cnn.com/
interactive/2017/02/health/nursing-home-sex-abuse-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/6Z4R-VJN6] 
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abound describing the sentencing of Dr. Larry Nassar to up to 175 years 
in prison for the sexual abuse of hundreds of young girls engaged in the 
USA Gymnastics program.35 Michigan State University president Lou 
Anna K. Simon states, “The survivor’s accounts are horrific. They are 
tragic, heartbreaking and personally gut-wrenching.”36 She resigned amid 
criticism of the failure of the university over many years to follow-up 
reports of sexual assault.37 Scandals such as these cause reputational 
damage with resulting economic consequences lasting many years.38 
D. New York United Way 
In the nonprofit world, one of the most notorious examples of lack 
of effective governance is found in the example of the New York United 
Way, where William Aramony, president of United Way of America from 
1970 to 1992, “spent six years in a federal prison after he was convicted 
in 1995 on 23 counts of felony charges, including conspiracy, fraud and 
filing false tax returns.”39 The Washington Post reports: 
(nursing homes); Lawrence J. Trautman, Kenneth J. Sanney, Eric D. Yordy, Tammy W. Cowart, and 
Destynie Sewell, Beginning To Think About Ethics and Values in an Age of Rapid Technological 
Change, http://ssrn.com/abstract=3102552 [https://perma.cc/GU9L-QL4C]. (Stanford University 
rape case). 
35. See Louise Radnofsky, U.S. Gymnastics Star Says She Too Was Assaulted by Doctor, 
WALL ST. J., (Jan. 16, 2018), at A3; Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Michigan State’s Defender Led 
Review of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 28, 2018), at A1; Rebecca Davis O’Brien, USOC Failed to Act 
on Reports of Abuse, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 2, 2018), at A3; Louise Radnofsky, Senators Want Olympics 
Chief to Resign, WALL ST. J., (Feb. 3–4, 2018), at A3; Rebecca Davis O’Brien, Investigation Is Called 
for Training Site, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 31, 2018), at A3. 
36. See Lou Anna K. Simon, President Simon Announces Resignation from MSU, MICH. ST. 
U. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://cabs.msu.edu/news/key-issues/issue-docs/simon-resigns.html 
[https://perma.cc/7TJJ-PHMY]. 
37. See Dan Barry, Serge F. Kovaleski & Juliet Macur, As F.B.I. Took a Year to Pursue the
Nassar Case, Dozens Say They Were Molested, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/sports/nassar-fbi.html [https://perma.cc/A5JJ-WTE3]; 
Matthew Haag & Marc Tracy, Michigan State President Lou Anna Simon Resigns Amid Nassar 
Fallout, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/
sports/olympics/michigan-state-president-resigns-lou-anna-simon.html [https://perma.cc/4Y3C-
3JCX]; Christine Hauser & Maggie Astor, The Larry Nassar Case: What Happened and How the 
Fallout Is Spreading, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/sports/larry-
nassar-gymnastics-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/QA8B-BKDJ].  
38. See Michael Luca, Patrick Rooney & Jonathan Smith, The Impact of Campus Scandals on 
College Applications, HARV. BUS. SCH. (2016), http://www.people.hbs.edu/mluca/
CollegeScandals.pdf [https://perma.cc/73RS-Y849]. 
39. See T. Rees Shapiro, United Way leader’s fraud scandal marred charitable legacy, WASH.
POST, (Nov. 14, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/united-way-leaders-fraud-
scandal-marred-charitable-legacy/2011/11/14/gIQALnwbMN_story.html?utm_term=.7c63a5c0edfc 
[https://perma.cc/35HH-K939].  
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Revelations that he used United Way funds to pay for extramarital 
affairs—including a dalliance he began with a teenager soon after she 
graduated high school—embarrassed one of the nation’s most respected 
charities. His actions moved scores of charitable organizations to review 
their business practices. 
. . . 
• As president, Mr. Aramony helped United Way annual
donations grow to more than $3 billion in 1990 from $787
million in 1970 . . .
. . . 
• Mr. Aramony was one of the highest-paid executives in the
charity field, earning an annual compensation package of more
than $460,000. Yet, as federal prosecutors charged, he used
United Way money to support a luxurious lifestyle that
included craps games in Las Vegas, frequenting velvet-rope
dance clubs and eating lobster dinners in tony restaurants.
. . . 
• He used United Way of America spinoff companies to buy and
decorate a $430,000 apartment in New York’s Upper East Side
and purchase a $125,000 condominium in Miami. . . .
. . . 
• Mr. Aramony used United Way money to take vacations with
[a 17 year old] and his other mistresses to Paris, London and
Cairo. . . .
• Mr. Aramony resigned from United Way of America in
February 1992, after The Post stories were published.
• During Mr. Aramony’s 1995 trial, four of his former lovers
testified against him. In his defense, Mr. Aramony’s lawyers
noted that a few weeks before he left United Way, board
members gave him a unanimous vote of confidence.
Ultimately, his lawyers called no witnesses. He was sentenced
to seven years in a federal penitentiary.40
E. Bernie Madoff Investment Scam 
New Yorker Bernard Madoff is credited with one of the biggest ever 
investment frauds when he “[plead] guilty to eleven federal felony charges 
40. Id.
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and admitted that his wealth management business was nothing but a shell 
for running a Ponzi scheme.”41 For more than two decades “he ran a $60 
billion-dollar Ponzi scheme . . . causing thousands of investors to lose 
large sums, in many instances their life savings. Because thousands of 
victims lost money to Madoff’s fraud, the prosecutors developed a 
website to provide information about the case to the victims.”42 Professors 
Cassell and Erez observe, “More than one hundred wrote letters or emails 
to the presiding judge in the case, Judge Danny Chin. During Madoff’s 
sentencing hearing, ten victims spoke: eight of whom had also submitted 
written statements and two of whom had not.”43 
Among the victims, The Washington Post reports that “the Alliance 
for Excellent Education . . . disclosed . . . that investment manager 
Bernard L. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme had wiped nearly $7 million from its 
balance sheets.”44 Investigative efforts from The Washington Post 
discloses that among nonprofits, “Investment fraud was blamed for some 
of the largest losses identified. Funds linked to Madoff’s scheme, which 
bilked investors across the country for decades, reportedly drained $106 
million from Yeshiva University . . . $38.8 million from the Upstate New 
York Engineers Health Fund and $26 million from New York 
University.”45 
F. FIFA Fraud and Corruption 
Internationally, the governing body of the most popular sport in the 
world has suffered embarrassment, humiliation, widespread bribery and 
corruption, convictions, and jail time.46 The April 2016 release of The 
41. United States v. Madoff (No. 1:09-cr-00213 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (April 20, 2009). See also
Kaushik Basu, Ponzis: The Science and Mystique of a Class of Financial Frauds, World Bank Group, 
Off. Chief Econ., 3 Policy Research Working Paper No. 6967), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/660611468148791146/pdf/WPS6967.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/48GB-HCGT ]; Stephen G. Dimmock & William C. Gerken, Finding Bernie 
Madoff: Detecting Fraud by Investment Managers, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1471631
[https://perma.cc/VT3Q-2VNB]; Miriam A. Cherry, Review Essay: Learning Contracts Through 
Current Events: Lawrence Cunningham’s Contracts in the Real World, Stories of Popular Contracts 
and Why They Matter, 35 U. HAW. L. REV. 129 (2013); Garima Rai, The Vulnerability to fraud: 
Factors, Motivations, and fraud detection and Deterrence, (April 19, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2962613 [https://perma.cc/S6KY-EX7G ]. 
42. See Paul G. Cassell & Edna Erez, Victim Impact Statements and Ancillary Harm: The
American Perspective, 15 CANADIAN CRIM. L. REV. 149 (2011). 
43. Id. 
44. See Stephens & Flaherty, supra note 4. 
45. See Stephens & Flaherty, supra note 4. 
46. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Following the Money: Lessons from the “Panama Papers,” 
Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 807, 807 (2017). 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss4/2
2018] NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE BASICS 991 
Panama Papers is the largest to date release of documents resulting from 
the year-long effort by over 400 journalists worldwide and “the 
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists [ICIJ] to expose a 
global pattern of crime and corruption.”47 As Trautman describes 
elsewhere: 
After release of the Panama papers, “Swiss authorities raided the 
headquarters of the European soccer association in Nyon, 
Switzerland . . . seizing information on television rights contracts with 
Argentine business executives implicated in the FIFA corruption 
scandal.” The New York Times article further reported that “FIFA’s 
independent ethics committee confirmed that one of its ethics lawyers 
was under internal investigation for a business relationship brought to 
light by the Panama Papers.” 
On May 27, 2015, a 47-count indictment was unsealed by the United 
States Department of Justice in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York. Fourteen defendants were charged in this 
indictment with “racketeering, wire fraud and money laundering 
conspiracies, among other offenses, in connection with the defendants’ 
participation in a 24-year scheme to enrich themselves through the 
corruption of international soccer.” On the same day, coordinated raids 
were held by “United States and Swiss officials on FIFA facilities in 
Miami and at FIFA headquarters in Zurich. Swiss authorities also 
conducted an early morning raid on Zurich’s luxury Baur du Lac Hotel 
arresting seven FIFA officials.” 
Known as soccer in the United States, “international football is the 
world’s most popular sport. It is played in every country, territory, and 
remote island on the planet . . . requiring no elaborate infrastructure, no 
expensive equipment, and no extraordinary physical characteristics for 
those who simply want to kick a ball toward a goal . . . .” 
According to the DOJ, FIFA is composed of 209 member associations, 
each representing organized soccer in a particular nation or territory, 
including the United States and four of its overseas territories. FIFA also 
recognizes six continental confederations that assist it in governing 
soccer in different regions of the world. The U.S. Soccer Federation is 
one of 41 member associations of the confederation known as 
CONCACAF, which has been headquartered in the United States 
throughout the period charged in the indictment. The South American 
confederation, called CONMEBOL, is also a focus of the indictment.  
47. Id. 
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As alleged in the indictment, FIFA and its six continental 
confederations, together with affiliated regional federations, national 
member associations and sports marketing companies, constitute an 
enterprise of legal entities associated in fact for purposes of the federal 
racketeering laws. The principal—and entirely legitimate—purpose of 
the enterprise is to regulate and promote the sport of soccer worldwide. 
As alleged in the indictment, one key way the enterprise derives revenue 
is to commercialize the media and marketing rights associated with 
soccer events and tournaments. The organizing entity that owns those 
rights—as FIFA and CONCACAF do with respect to the World Cup and 
Gold Cup, their respective flagship tournaments—sells them to sports 
marketing companies, often through multi-year contracts covering 
multiple editions of the tournaments. The sports marketing companies, 
in turn, sell the rights downstream to TV and radio broadcast networks, 
major corporate sponsors and other sub-licensees who want to broadcast 
the matches or promote their brands. The revenue generated from these 
contracts is substantial: according to FIFA, 70% of its $5.7 billion in 
total revenues between 2011 and 2014 was attributable to the sale of TV 
and marketing rights to the 2014 World Cup.48 
G. Beware of Foreign Operations 
On August 29, 2017, the DOJ filed a criminal complaint against 
Joseph Baptiste, a founder of a nonprofit intended to assist the poor in 
Haiti, and also a retired U.S. Army colonel. He was charged in a criminal 
complaint, “stemming from his alleged role in a corruption scheme 
connected to a Haitian development project.”49 According to Gibson 
Dunn: 
Unbeknownst to Baptiste, the project’s investors who provided him the 
bribe money were undercover FBI agents. Unbeknownst to the 
undercover FBI agents, Baptiste used the $50,000 down payment on a 
bribe for his own personal expenses. DOJ alleges that there was an 
FCPA violation because Baptiste allegedly intended to use additional 
payments for actual bribery of Haitian port officials. Baptiste reportedly 
entered into a signed plea agreement with DOJ after being approached 
by authorities and before the charges were made public, but then backed 
out of that deal, leading to his arrest.50 
48. Id. 823–25 (citations omitted). 
49. See 2017 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN 12 (Jan. 2, 2018),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/2017-year-end-fcpa-update/ [https://perma.cc/5KGG-5KAL]. 
50. Id. 
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It appears that bribery and corruption minefields are everywhere, as 
demonstrated during 2017 by revelations “concern[ing] a new branch of 
corruption at the United Nations.”51 John Ashe, former President of the 
U.N. General Assembly, has been implicated in “a scheme to corruptly 
influence a plan to build a U.N.-sponsored conference center in 
Macau. . . . On November 20, 2017, DOJ unsealed a criminal complaint 
alleging a completely distinct bribery scheme involving Ashe’s successor 
to the U.N. General Assembly presidency.”52 Gibson Dunn reports: 
Chi Ping Patrick Ho, the head of a non-governmental organization that 
holds “special consultative status” at the United Nations and is 
associated with the China Energy Fund, and Cheikh Gadio, the former 
Foreign Minister of Senegal and a business consultant, were each 
charged with substantive and conspiracy FCPA and money laundering 
violations associated with two separate bribery schemes. The first 
involved an alleged scheme to pay $2 million to the President of Chad 
to secure valuable oil concessions and reduce a substantial fine for 
environmental violations by Ho’s Chinese employer. The second 
scheme, allegedly “hatched in the hallways of the United Nations,” 
involved a separate plan to bribe the current Foreign Minister of Uganda 
and then-President of the U.N. General Assembly with $500,000 for 
various illicit benefits, including a share in profits from a Ugandan joint 
venture with Ho’s Chinese employer. . . . Neither individual has yet 
(publicly) entered a plea in connection with these charges.53 
IV. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE REQUIREMENTS
As we have seen in Exhibit 1, the largest U.S. charities are 
substantially donor dependent and therefore reliant upon the motivation 
of contributor tax deductions for the bulk of their revenues. Federal law, 
in what is commonly referred to by the shorthand expression section 501, 
provides for tax-exempt status for certain entities,54 and also provides that 
contributions to tax-exempt entities are tax deductible for the donors.55 
51. Id. at 13. 
52. Id.; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, U.S. Entrepreneurial Risk in International Markets:
Focus on Bribery and Corruption, (Feb. 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscripts) (on file with authors), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2912072 [https://perma.cc/MSE4-HQMV]; Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara 
Altenbaumer-Price, Lawyers, Guns and Money – The Bribery Problem and U.K. Bribery Act, 47 INT’L 
L. 481 (2013); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An 
Update on Enforcement and SEC and DOJ Guidance, 41 SEC. REG. L.J. 241 (2013); Joanna Kimbell 
& Lawrence J. Trautman, Bribery and Corruption: The COSO Framework, FCPA, and U.K. Bribery 
Act, 30(3) FLA. J. INT’L L. (2019).   
53. See 2017 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 50, at 13(emphasis in original).
54. I.R.C. §501(a) (West 2017). 
55. I.R.C. §170 (West 2019). 
23
Trautman and Ford: Nonprofit Governance: The Basics
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
994 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:971 
Accordingly, nonprofit governance must be conducted with an 
understanding of and strict compliance with Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) regulations that govern tax deductibility of donations. Such 
awareness and focus is paramount to the health, wellbeing, and survival 
of nonprofit organizations. 
Nonprofit organizations, like their for-profit counterparts, are subject 
to a variety of state and federal laws and must comply with applicable 
laws at both levels in order to maintain their tax-exempt status and thus 
the tax deductibility of contributions by donors. As noted by the IRS, 
“[n]onprofit status is a state law concept. . . . [O]rganizing as a nonprofit 
organization at the state level does not automatically grant the 
organization exemption from federal income tax.”56 A nonprofit 
organization begins its existence under state law by filing the necessary 
documents with and submitting the required fees to the appropriate state 
office, typically the Secretary of State. In order to obtain tax-exempt status 
from the IRS, the nonprofit entity must include in its charter a purposes 
provision and a dissolution provision. The purposes provision ensures that 
the organization will pursue activities and objectives that fall within the 
exemption requirements of section 501, and the dissolution provision 
ensures that, upon dissolution of the organization, its assets will be 
distributed either for another exempt purpose under section 501(c) or to 
the federal, state, or local government.57 
Once the nonprofit entity has been established under state law, it may 
then apply to the IRS for tax-exempt status. The organization must obtain 
a federal Employer Identification Number (EIN) regardless of whether it 
has employees. The EIN serves as an identifier for the organization in its 
interactions with the IRS in much the same way that a Social Security 
Number identifies individual taxpayers.58 In addition to the application 
itself (Form 1023 or Form 1023 EZ), the IRS requires copies of the 
organization’s state charter and a filing fee. If the IRS reviewer finds that 
the organization’s application is complete and meets all requirements for 
tax-exempt status, the IRS will issue a determination letter or ruling 
granting tax-exempt status.59 
56. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Frequently Asked Questions about Applying for Tax
Exemption, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/frequently-asked-questions-about-applying-
for-tax-exemption [https://perma.cc/3424-HE9M]. 
57. 26 C.F.R §1.501(c)(3)-1 (West 2017).
58. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Employee Identification Number, https://www.irs.gov/
charities-non-profits/employer-identification-number [https://perma.cc/3BY3-ENU4]. 
59. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Exempt Organizations – Rulings and Determinations
Letters, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exempt-organizations-
rulings-and-determinations-letters [https://perma.cc/DCM8-8J9S].  
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While the application process for tax-exempt status may seem 
straightforward, the interim period between the creation of the nonprofit 
entity under state law and the granting of tax-exempt status by the IRS 
poses some practical concerns that must be addressed by the governing 
board of the nonprofit. Perhaps the primary concern is whether or to what 
extent contributions made to the organization during this interim period 
are tax deductible. The answer is: It depends. If the organization files a 
timely application and the IRS grants tax-exempt status, then its tax-
exempt status dates back to the date of its organization and contributions 
received during that interim period are tax deductible. However, if tax-
exempt status is denied, then those contributions are not tax deductible.60 
This begs the question: what is a timely application? Under current IRS 
policy, a nonprofit entity’s tax-exempt status will be retroactive to the date 
on which it was organized if its application was filed within 27 months 
from the end of the month in which it was organized. If the application is 
filed after that 27-month window, then tax-exempt status, and thus the tax-
deductibility of contributions, will be retroactive only to the date of the 
application’s receipt, defined as either the postmark date on the cover of 
the application or the date that is stamped on the application when it is 
actually received by the IRS.61 
The interim period between a nonprofit’s organization and its receipt 
of tax-exempt status from the IRS is also a period that requires careful 
recordkeeping and reporting, as well as oversight of the organization’s 
activities to ensure that it does not jeopardize its pending tax-exempt 
status. Most nonprofit organizations, with some exceptions, are required 
to file annual exempt organization returns (Form 990 or one of its 
variants) with the IRS, even while their application for tax-exempt status 
is pending.62 Filing Form 990 late, filing an incomplete return, or failing 
to file at all will trigger penalties unless the organization can show 
reasonable cause for the failure to properly file. Importantly for all tax-
exempt organizations, failure to file a Form 990 for three consecutive 
years will trigger an automatic revocation of tax-exempt status.63 
Once tax-exempt status has been granted by the IRS, a nonprofit 
organization must protect this status through required filings, such as the 
60. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Contributions to Organization with IRS Application
Pending, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/contributions-to-
organization-with-irs-application-pending [https://perma.cc/M3AL-GZ6S]. 
61. Tax Exempt Status for Your Organization, I.R.S. Pub. No. 557, Cat. No. 46573C, at 22
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf [https://perma.cc/W47R-RE65]. 
62. I.R.C. §6033 (West Mar. 23, 2018). 
63. I.R.C. §6033(j) (West Mar. 23, 2018).
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Form 990 discussed above, along with any additional information 
required by the federal or state government. While Form 990 or one of its 
variants, Form 990-EZ or Form 990-N (the e-postcard), is used by most 
nonprofit tax-exempt organizations, there are special forms for certain 
categories of nonprofits, such as Form 1065 for religious organizations or 
Form 5500 for employee benefit trusts.64 In addition to information 
concerning revenue and disbursements, Forms 990 and 990-EZ also 
require a brief summary of the organization’s activities and 
accomplishments for the reporting period. Form 990 and Form 990-EZ 
also require disclosure of the organization’s governance structure and 
practices. The three most recent annual exemption returns filed by tax-
exempt organizations are required to be available for public inspection.65 
In addition to annual filings required under the Internal Revenue 
Code, many states also require annual financial statements to be filed or 
made available to the public as well.66 As with for-profit entities, state 
laws typically require that a nonprofit’s leadership meet regularly and 
maintain minutes of actions taken.67 Many states require that a nonprofit 
64. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Exempt Organizations Annual Reporting Requirements – 
Overview – Annual Return Filing Exceptions, https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/exempt-
organizations-annual-reporting-requirements-overview-annual-return-filing-exceptions 
[https://perma.cc/A4K8-R4FP ]. 
65. I.R.C. §6104(d) (West Dec. 19, 2014).
66. See, e.g. ARK. CODE ANN. §4-28-403 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 12, §8F (2017); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §55A-16-24 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §128.670 (2017); TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. 
§22.353 (2017). 
67. See, e.g. ALA. CODE §§10A-2.13, 2.32 (2018); ALASKA STAT. §§10.20.116, 131 (2018); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§10.3820, 11601 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. §4-28-218 (2018); CAL. CORP. 
CODE §6320 (WEST 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. §§7-128-201, 136-101(2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§33-
1095, 1235 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, §224 (2018); D.C. CODE §§29-406.20, 413.01 (2018); 
FLA. STAT. §§617.0820,1601 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. §§14-3-820, 1601 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§§414D-143, 301 (2018); IDAHO CODE §§30-6-1101, 30-612 (2018); ILL. COMP. STAT. 805 ILCS 105/ 
§§107.75, 108.20 (2018); IND. CODE §§23-17-15-1,27-1 (2018); IOWA CODE §§504.821, 1601 (2019); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§273.223, 233 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§17-6301, 6514 (2018); LA. STAT. 
ANN. §§12:223, 224 (2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13-B, §§705, 715 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., 
CORP. & ASS’N., §2-409 (LEXISNEXIS 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 156B, §§32, 56 (2017); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS §§450.2485, 2521 (2017); MINN. STAT. §§317A.231, 461 (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§§79-11-255, 283 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. §§355.376, 821 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. §§35-2-427, 
906 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. §§21-1980, 19165 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. §§82.181, 266 (2018); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§15A:5-24, 6-10 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§53-8-22, 27(2018); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
CORP. LAW §§621, 710 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§55A-8-20, 16-01 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE §§10-
33-39, 80 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§1702.15, 31 (2018); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 18, §§1027, 1069 
(2017); OR. REV. STAT. §§65.337, 771 (2017); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§1508, 1703 (2018); 7 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§7-6-27, 30 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. §§33-31-820, 1601 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§47-
23-21, 24-1 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §§48-58-201, 66-101 (2018); TEX. BUS. ORG. CODE ANN. 
§§22.220, 351 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §§16-6A-812, 1601 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 11B, 
§§8.20, 16.01 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. §§13.1-864, 932 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE §§24.03.120, 135 
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organization register with or obtain a license from the state prior to 
soliciting contributions from their citizens.68 A nonprofit organization that 
fails to comply with state recordkeeping and reporting requirements may 
be administratively dissolved by the Secretary of State or other official69 
or judicially dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.70 
The governing body of a nonprofit organization may also jeopardize 
its tax-exempt status by allowing that organization to engage in forbidden 
activity or forbidden transactions. Section 501 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, through its many sub-sections, provides the opportunity for a wide 
variety of organizations to be granted tax-exempt status.71 The common 
(2018); W. VA. CODE §§31E-8-820, 15-1501 (2018); WIS. STAT. §§181.0820, 1601 (2019); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. §§17-19-820, 1601 (2018). 
68. See, e.g. ALA. CODE §13A-9-71 (2018); ALASKA STAT. §45.68.010 (2018); ARK. CODE 
ANN. §4-28-402 (2018); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §17510.3 (WEST 2018); COLO. REV. STAT. §6-16-
104 (2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. §21A-190B (2018); D.C. CODE §44-1703 (2018); FLA. STAT. §496.405 
(2018); GA. CODE ANN. §43-17-3.1 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. §467B-2.1 (2018); IDAHO CODE §48-
1004 (2018); ILL. COMP. STAT. 225 ILCS 460/ §2 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. §17-1761 (2018); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §367.657 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:1901.1 (2018); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, 
§ 5004 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. §6-401 (LEXISNEXIS 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 12, 
§8E (2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS §400.273 (2017); MINN. STAT. §309.52 (2018); MISS. CODE ANN.
§79-11-503 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 355.456 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. §82A.100 (2018); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §7:28-B (2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. §45:17A-23 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §57-22-6 (2018); 
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §115 (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. §131F-5 (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§50-22-02 (2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §1716.02 (2018); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 18, §552.3 (2017); OR. 
REV. STAT. §65.337 (2017); 10 PA. CONS. STAT. §162.5 (2018); 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS §5-53.1-2 (2018); 
S.C. CODE ANN. §33-56-30 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §48-101-504 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. §13-
22-5 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 9, §2473 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. §57-49 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE 
§19.09.065 (2018); W. VA. CODE §29-19-5 (2018); WIS. STAT. §202.12 (2019). 
69. See, e.g. ALASKA STAT. §10.20.325 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§10-11420-11422; 
CONN. GEN. STAT. §33-1181 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. §14-3-1420 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. §414D-
249 (2018); ILL. COMP. STAT. 805 ILCS 105/ §112.35 (2018); IOWA CODE §504.1421 (2019); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13-B, §1112 (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. §79-11-347 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 
355.706 (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. §21-19,137 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §53-8-53 (2018); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §55A-14-20 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §65.647 (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. §33-31-1420 (2018); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §47-24-13.1 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §48-64-201 (2018); TEX. BUS. ORG. 
CODE ANN. §22.360 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §16-6A-1410 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 11B, §14.20 
(2018); VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-915 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE §23.95.605 (2018); W. VA. CODE 
§31E-13-1320 (2018); WIS. STAT. §181.1420 (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. §17-19-1420 (2018). 
70. See, e.g. ALASKA STAT. §10.20.325 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§10-11420-11422; 
CONN. GEN. STAT. §33-1181 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. §14-3-1420 (2018); HAW. REV. STAT. §414D-
249 (2018); ILL. COMP. STAT. 805 ILCS 105/ §112.35 (2018); IOWA CODE §504.1421 (2019); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13-B, §1112 (2018); MISS. CODE ANN. §79-11-347 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 
355.706 (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. §21-19,137 (2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §53-8-53 (2018); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. §55A-14-20 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. §65.647 (2017); S.C. CODE ANN. §33-31-1420 (2018); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §47-24-13.1 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §48-64-201 (2018); TEX. BUS. ORG. 
CODE ANN. §22.360 (2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §16-6A-1410 (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 11B, §14.20 
(2018); VA. CODE ANN. §13.1-915 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE §23.95.605 (2018); W. VA. CODE 
§31E-13-1320 (2018); WIS. STAT. §181.1420 (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. §17-19-1420 (2018). 
71. I.R.C. §501 (West 2017). 
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thread that runs through the many categories of potentially tax-exempt 
organizations is that they must not serve as investment vehicles whose 
profits “inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”72 
Additionally, a substantial portion of a tax-exempt organization’s 
activities and expenditures must be addressed to objectives other than 
influencing legislation.73 The law allows for limited lobbying efforts but 
sets out a maximum amount, based on exempt purpose expenditures, that 
a section 501 entity may expend for such purposes.74 Section 501(c)(3), 
under which many nonprofit organizations obtain tax exemption, includes 
a flat prohibition of political activity that supports or opposes a candidate 
for public office.75 Nonprofit governance must ensure that the private 
benefit and political restrictions are carefully observed. 
V. 2017 TAX CUTS: CRISIS FOR NONPROFITS? 
Changes in the tax code during late 2017 have resulted in concern 
among some nonprofit executives as to whether donations may decline as 
a result. The Wall Street Journal reports that toward the end of 2017, 
“Americans . . . poured money into charitable-giving vehicles known as 
donor-advised funds, which allow immediate tax deductions but gradual 
distributions to nonprofits ̶ a sign of ways the new tax law could reshape 
how Americans donate money for years to come.”76 
Not-for-profit colleges and hospitals, according to National Council 
of Nonprofit vice president David Thompson, “are probably going to be 
fine because they tend to have development offices and tend to have big 
donors. . . . It’s the front-line human services groups. They rely on 
donations in the community and those are the ones that are probably going 
to dry up.”77 The Council on Foundations estimates that the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act “will drain $16 billion to $24 billion a year from the nonprofit 
72. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West 2017). 
73. Id. 
74. I.R.C. §501(h); 26 U.S.C. §4911 (West 2017). 
75. I.R.C. §501(c)(3) (West 2017). 
76. See Richard Rubin, Charity Funds Take Off as Tax Law Reshapes Giving, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 1, 2018) at A1, https://www.wsj.com/articles/charity-funds-take-off-as-tax-law-reshapes-
giving-1517502089 [https://perma.cc/3544-352N]. 
77. See J.B. Wogan, Tax Law Could Deliver Billion-Dollar Blow to Social Services,
GOVERNING (Jan. 17, 2018), http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-
nonprofits-tax-law-charitable-giving-human-services.html [https://perma.cc/8JP7-4FR6].  
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sector going forward.”78 In a Los Angeles Times Op-Ed, Bryan 
McQueeney writes: 
The problem is that while the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act preserves the 
deductibility of charitable contributions, it restructures the system so 
that millions will lose incentives to give. Most people donate from their 
hearts to causes they care about, regardless of taxes. It is undeniable, 
however, that the reward for giving will go down and the cost of giving 
will go up. . . . The Tax Cuts Act simultaneously raises the standard 
deduction to $24,000 for a married couple. For millions it will no longer 
make sense to itemize, and that too means fewer charitable gifts: You 
can only deduct donations if you itemize.79 
Regarding the likely impact of recent tax code changes resulting in 
lower rates and therefore less value to the taxpayer for charitable 
donations, director Deborah Cannon states, “While the tax changes may 
create less benefit from a donation, those individuals who believe strongly 
in a nonprofit’s mission may have more disposable income to contribute 
and donors who gave only because of a tax benefit aren’t ones who are 
going to advance the mission of the organization.”80 Director Jack Lowe 
states, “The changes in the tax code will require non-profit boards even 
more clearly demonstrate and communicate their organization’s value 
proposition.”81 University of Texas at Dallas professor Dennis 
McCuistion says: 
While there is always angst among the nonprofit community when tax 
rates are lowered, I think that less taxes means more giving not less 
because there is more to give. Also, while taxes are A factor, they are 
seldom THE factor and small gifts that are so important are seldom even 
deductible anyway, so why worry?82 
78. See Bryan McQueeney, Op-Ed: The GOP tax reform will devastate charitable giving, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 27, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcqueeney-charitable-giving-
under-new-tax-law-20171227-story.html [https://perma.cc/4FMM-T6V9]. 
79. Id. 
80. See e-mail from Deborah Cannon, Corporate and nonprofit director, to Lawrence J.
Trautman (Jan. 26, 2018) (on file with authors). 
81. See e-mail from Jack Lowe, Corporate Director, to Lawrence J. Trautman (Feb. 21, 2018,
13:59 EST)(on file with authors). 
82. See e-mail from Dennis McCuistion, Clinical Professor of Corporate Governance,
University of Texas at Dallas; Executive Dir., Institute for Excellence in Corporate Governance, to 
Lawrence J. Trautman (Jan. 21, 2018, 11:24 EST) (on file with authors). 
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VI. GOVERNANCE: THE BASICS
A considerable amount of scholarship has been written about 
corporate governance and the duties owed by directors to shareholders in 
a for-profit, particularly publicly-traded situation.83 While less has been 
written about governance in a nonprofit enterprise, many of the same 
fiduciary duties apply.84 
83. See John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Elements of
Corporate Law. Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 20/2009; Yale Law, Economics & Public 
Policy Research Paper No. 387; Harvard Law and Economics Research Paper No. 643; Harvard 
Public Law Working Paper No. 09-39; ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 134/2009, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1436551 [https://perma.cc/PLX9-UC8B]; 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
1735 (2006); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value. 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1275 (2002); John Coffee, The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and its Implications (Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic 
Studies, Working Paper No. 144, 1999), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=142833 
[https://perma.cc/EBX8-ZWSY]; David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Seven Myths of Boards of 
Directors, INSIGHTS BY STAN. BUS. (Oct. 12, 2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/seven-
myths-boards-directors [https://perma.cc/N7PA-YVXC]; Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, 
Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1843 (2007); Brian Tayan, The Wells Fargo Cross-Selling Scandal, Rock Center for Corporate 
Governance at Stanford University Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate 
Governance No. CGRP-62; Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-
1 (Dec. 2, 2016); Chris W. Waddell, Waddell, Kendrick Nguyen, Evan Epstein, Francis Daniel 
Siciliano & Joseph Grundfest, Identifying the Legal Contours of the Separation of Economic Rights 
and Voting Rights in Publicly Held Corporations (Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford 
University Working Paper No. 90, 2010).  
84. See Byron F. Egan, How Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases Affect Advice to Directors and
Officers of Delaware and Texas Corporations, 37th Ann. Conf. on Sec. Reg. & Bus. L. 7, 178 (Feb. 
13, 2015). See also Ellen P. Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About Regulation 
of Nonprofit Governance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 765 (2007); Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological 
Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a 
Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701 (2008); Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What’s Trust Law 
Got to Do with it?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641 (2005); Sue Chen, Art Deaccessions and the Limits of 
Fiduciary Duty, 14 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 103 (2009); Brian D. Galle, Why Do Foundations Follow 
the Law?: Evidence from Adoption of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act, 
36 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 532 (2017); Urs Gasser, Herbert Burkert, John G. Palfrey & Jonathan 
L. Zittrain, Accountability and Transparency at ICANN, Berkman Center Research Pub. No. 2010-13 
(2010); Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance - A 
Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347 (2012); Klaus 
J. Hopt, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Some Corporate Governance Thoughts from Europe 
(European Corp. Govn. Institute - Law Working Paper No. 125 2009); Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable 
Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should Not Curb Board Discretion Over a Charitable 
Corporation’s Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689 (2005); Elizabeth K. 
Keating, Mary Fischer, Teresa P. Gordon & Janet S. Greenlee, Assessing Financial Vulnerability in 
the Nonprofit Sector (KSG Working Paper No. RWP05-002; Hauser Center for Nonprofit 
Organizations Paper No. 27 2005); Benjamin M. Leff, Federal Regulation of Nonprofit Board 
Independence: Focus on Independent Stakeholders as a ‘Middle Way’, 99 KY. L.J. 731 (2011); Roy 
Mersland & R. Øystein Strøm, Performance and Corporate Governance in Microfinance Institutions, 
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 4, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss4/2
2018] NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE BASICS 1001 
Governance law fundamentals for nonprofit organizations largely 
mirror those of for-profit organizations and are driven primarily by state 
laws. The IRS does not mandate any particular governance structure as a 
condition of tax-exempt status. However, the IRS strongly encourages 
nonprofit entities to adopt and maintain sound management practices.85 
Additionally, failure to remain in good standing under state law threatens 
the very existence of a nonprofit organization and will necessarily threaten 
its tax-exempt status. Accordingly, every member of an organization’s 
governing body must have a basic understanding of that body’s legal 
obligations and his or her role in meeting those obligations. The 
discussion below highlights some of the major state law requirements that 
must be satisfied in order for nonprofit organizations to remain in good 
standing with their state of incorporation. A number of states have 
adopted, with or without modifications, some version of either the Model 
Nonprofit Corporation Act86 (MNCA) drafted by the American Bar 
Association or the Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act87 
(UUNAA) drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, or a combination of both. Both acts, and those of 
most states, are organized roughly by the life cycle of a nonprofit 
organization. For illustration purposes, we will refer to the laws of the 
MNCA and UUNAA. However, every state is different, and the laws of 
the relevant state must be applied. 
Once a nonprofit entity is formed, the MNCA requires that a board 
of directors, if not named in the articles of incorporation, be elected.88 The 
33 J. BANKING & FIN. 662 (2007); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Nonprofit Organizations as Investor 
Protection: Economic Theory, and Evidence from East Asia, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 169 (2004); Alicia 
Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215 (2013); Dana Brakman Reiser, 
Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2011); Mark Sidel, The Promise and Limits of 
Collective Action for Nonprofit Self-Regulation: Evidence from Asia, 39 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY 
SECTOR Q. 1039 (2010); Robert J. Yetman & Michelle Yetman, The Effects of Governance on the 
Accuracy of Charitable Expenses Reported by Nonprofit Organizations (2011). 
85. U.S. Department of The Treasury Internal Revenue Service, Governance and Related
Topics – 501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS (2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/governance_
practices.pdf [https://perma.cc/HBD7-QPW2]. 
86. American Bar Association, Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, (Draft Revision),
AMERICANBAR (2017), apps.americanbar.org/dch/thedl.cfm?filename=/CL580012/newsletterpubs/
mnca.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3RS-8H6M]. The ABA subcommittee responsible for this model act is 
currently in the process of reviewing and revising it so that it will conform to the Model Business 
Corporations Act, last revised in 2016. 
87. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Unincorporated 
Nonprofit Association Act, UNIFORMLAWS (2015), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=
Unincorporated%20Nonprofit%20Association%20Act%20(2008)%20(Last%20Amended%202011 
[https://perma.cc/K8AJ-GGZ9]. 
88. MNCA § 2.05 (2017).
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UUNAA provides for governance of the organization through one or more 
managers, which may but need not be labeled as a board of directors.89 
The broad scope of the term manager under the UUNAA easily 
encompasses what are traditionally thought of as officers of an 
organization, such as president, secretary, or treasurer. The MNCA and 
UUNAA both provide that nonprofit organization may have members, 
and contain provisions outlining the rights and responsibilities of those 
members.90 But whether there are members or not, both acts contemplate 
that there will be some kind of governing body. 
The governing body of a nonprofit organization may, but under the 
MNCA is not required to, adopt bylaws.91 The UUNAA likewise does not 
require formal bylaws, but speaks in terms of governing principles. This 
term encompasses not only bylaws, to the extent they exist for a particular 
organization, but also “agreements, whether oral, in a record, or implied 
from its established practices, or in any combination thereof, which 
govern the purpose or operation of an unincorporated nonprofit 
association . . . .”92 
Both acts contain provisions that specifically outline the rights and 
responsibilities of directors. As noted above, the MNCA requires that a 
nonprofit organizations have a board of directors with fixed terms, with 
some exceptions. Under the MNCA, a nonprofit organization may 
establish a “designated body” to exercise the powers that would ordinarily 
be exercised by a board.93 The UUNAA is somewhat more flexible in how 
a nonprofit organization’s governing body is denominated and structured, 
but it achieves essentially the same result. Both acts place responsibility 
for oversight of the organization’s activities upon its governing body.94 
Neither act specifies any particular qualifications that a director or 
manager must possess. Under both the MNCA and UUNAA, members of 
a nonprofit organization’s governing body owe a fiduciary duty to the 
organization, requiring them to act in good faith, with due care, and in 
what they “reasonably believe[]” to be in the best interest of their 
organization.95 
In discharging their duties to a nonprofit organization, members of 
its governing body may participate in regular or specially called 
89. UUNAA § 2(3) (2015). 
90. MNCA § 6.01 (2017) and UUNAA §2(4) (2015). 
91. MNCA § 2.06 (2017). 
92. UUNAA § 2(2) (2015). 
93. MNCA § 8.12 (2017). 
94. MNCA § 8.01 (2017) and UUNAA § 21 (2015). 
95. MNCA § 8.30 (2017) and UUNAA § 22 (2015). 
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meetings.96 To inform their decision making when acting in their 
governance role, directors or managers have a right to relevant 
information,97 and are generally shielded from liability for their decisions 
and actions, provided they have been made in good faith and upon due 
diligence.98 Both acts also provide for indemnification to directors or 
managers who incur expenses or are made a party to a proceeding as a 
result of their actions, provided that they have met their fiduciary 
obligations.99 
Because it places governance under the broad umbrella term of 
“manager(s),” the UUNAA does not have provisions addressed 
specifically to “officers” in the traditional sense of corporate governance. 
The MNCA, however, contains a separate subchapter addressed to 
officers. Under the MNCA, a nonprofit organization “has the officers 
described in its articles of incorporation or bylaws, or appointed or elected 
by the board of directors in accordance with the articles or bylaws.”100 
VII. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Like directors, officers owe a fiduciary duty to the organization and 
must act in good faith, with due care, and in a manner they reasonably 
believe to be in the best interest of the organization.101 Like directors, 
officers who have complied with their fiduciary obligations are shielded 
from liability102 and may be entitled to indemnification for expenses or 
costs associated with their actions as officers.103 
The UUNAA does not contain a provision that specifically mandates 
records to be kept by the organization,104 but the MNCA requires that 
certain records be generated and maintained by the organization for a 
specified period of time.105 The MNCA grants members of the 
organization the right to inspect the records that must be maintained,106 
and, to the extent that an organization subject to the UUNAA generates 
96. MNCA § 8.20 (2017) and UUNAA § 23 (2015). 
97. MNCA § 8.30 (2017) and UUNAA § 24 (2015). 
98. MNCA § 8.31 (2017) and UUNAA § 8 (2015). 
99. MNCA § 8.51 et seq. (2017) and UUNAA § 26 (2015). 
100.  MNCA § 8.40 (2017). 
101.  MNCA § 8.42 (2017). 
102.  MNCA § 8.42(d) (2017). 
103.  MNCA § 8.50 et seq. (2017). 
104.  UUNAA § 24, comment (2015). 
105.  MNCA § 16.01 (2017). 
106.  MNCA § 16.02 (2017). 
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records, that act also grants a right of inspection to members and 
managers.107 
VIII. IMPORTANCE OF STATE LAW
Application of state law regarding fiduciary duties of directors may 
be observed in the fifth circuit’s sharp criticism in Gearhart Industries, 
Inc. v. Smith International of the parties’ failure to cite Texas cases in 
their briefs and reliance on Delaware case law: 
We are both surprised and inconvenienced by the circumstances that, 
despite their multitudinous and voluminous briefs and exhibits, neither 
plaintiffs nor defendants seriously attempted to analyze officers’ and 
directors’ fiduciary duties or the business judgment rule under Texas 
law. This is particularly so in view of the authorities cited in their 
discussions of the business judgment rule: Smith and Gearhart argue 
back and forth over the applicability of the plethora of out-of-state cases 
they cite, yet they ignore the fact that we are obligated to decide these 
aspects of this case under Texas law. . . .108 
Byron Egan observes that: 
The Fifth Circuit stated in Gearhart that under Texas law “[t]hree broad 
duties stem from the fiduciary status of corporate directors; namely the 
duties of obedience, loyalty, and due care,” and commented that (i) the 
duty of obedience requires a director to avoid committing ultra vires 
acts, i.e., acts beyond the scope of the authority of the corporation as 
defined by its articles of incorporation or the laws of the state of 
incorporation, (ii) the duty of loyalty dictates that a director must act in 
good faith and must not allow his personal interests to prevail over the 
interests of the corporation, and (iii) the duty of due care requires that a 
director must handle his corporate duties with such care as an ordinarily 
prudent man would use under similar circumstances. Good faith under 
Gearhart is an element of the duty of loyalty. Gearhart remains the 
seminal case for defining the fiduciary duties of directors in 
Texas . . . .109 
107.  UUNAA § 24 (2015). 
 108.  See Byron F. Egan, How Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases Affect Advice to Directors and 
Officers of Delaware and Texas Corporations, 37th Ann. Conf. on Sec. Reg. & Bus. L. 7 (Feb. 13, 
2015) (citing Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984) (emphasis 
in original, internal citations omitted)).  
109.  Id. at 7. 
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IX. CORE PERSON ATTRIBUTES, QUALITIES, AND SKILLS REQUIRED OF
EVERY DIRECTOR 
A. Every Nonprofit Board Has an Insatiable Need for Director Talent 
Every board is responsible for approving nominees for election as 
directors. To assist in this task, most boards will designate a standing 
committee, usually called the “nominating and governance committee,” 
which is responsible for reviewing and recommending nominees to the 
board. In a for-profit environment, the nominating and governance 
committee should be comprised solely of independent directors as defined 
by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)110 and the board’s 
corporate governance guidelines. A written charter for every standing 
committee should be adopted by the full board.111 Although nonprofit 
organizations are not subject to the same requirements as publicly-traded 
enterprises, use of SEC-mandated reporting requirements, practices and 
standards may help ensure better nonprofit governance. Therefore, in 
evaluating the qualifications of candidates, the nominating and 
governance committee will be well advised to look for the following 
minimum desired personal attributes, qualifications, qualities, 
professional skills, and experience in all director candidates. 
B. Desired Personal Attributes 
What human qualities are desired for every board member? This 
seems an appropriate starting point for director recruitment and selection. 
Every nonprofit board should agree on a clear statement of desired 
personal attributes of all board members to provide guidance to the 
nominating and governance committee as they search for director 
candidates. As is the case in for-profit enterprises, each director candidate 
should possess the following necessary core personal attributes: high 
standards of ethical behavior; availability; outstanding achievement in the 
individual’s personal and professional life; possession of strong 
 110.  See SEC, NASD & NYSE Rulemaking Rel. No. 34-48745, NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: 
Relating to Corporate Governance (2003).  
 111.  See NYSE Euronext Corporate Governance Guide, NYSE (2014), 
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/NYSE_Corporate_Governance_Guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y92L-VAPA]. See also Katherine M. O’Regan & Sharon M. Oster, Does the 
Structure and Composition of the Board Matter? The Case of Nonprofit Organizations, 21(1) J. L., 
ECON. & ORGAN. 205 (2005). 
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interpersonal and communication skills; independence; and soundness of 
judgment.112 
C. Personal Integrity 
Every board nominating committee should have a focus on personal 
integrity as a sought-after candidate characteristic. High standards of 
ethical behavior are an absolute must. The potential costs to the enterprise 
and other directors are just too high to assume likely risks. The risk of 
litigation for lapses of personal integrity is a major reason why for-profit 
boards tend to find directors who are already well-known to at least one 
sitting director when looking for replacements. This propensity appears 
motivated by the desire of sitting directors to mitigate perceived risks to 
themselves and the organization. The risk, to both reputation and personal 
net worth, is likely reduced by recruitment of a new already-known 
director. Far too many instances of fraud or substantial injury brought 
upon a nonprofit raise the question, “where were the directors?”113 
D. Adequate Time Availability and Schedule Flexibility 
As we ponder the impact of fraud on many of our most important 
nonprofit institutions, consider how much time a directorship should 
require. Certainly, serving on a for-profit board these days requires a 
significant time commitment, even under normal circumstances. The last 
two decades has brought significant increases to the time demands placed 
on directors. Sarbanes-Oxley legislation114 during 2002 and Dodd-Frank 
reforms115 have each added many hours to the amount of time directors 
must devote to board responsibilities. As a result, while each board is 
different, Kenneth P. Kopelman observes: 
Trying to overlay upwards of 175 hours of annual board service—
including review and preparation, travel, board and committee meetings, 
plus informal calls and emails on top of a full time staff or line job is 
surely a challenge both for the executive and his or her employer. 
 112.  Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for Director Selection and 
Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75, 82 (2012) [hereinafter “The Matrix”]. 
 113.  See discussion of United Way of New York, supra note 39; Penn State University and Jerry 
Sandusky, supra note 29; Michigan State University and Dr. Larry Nassar, supra note 35. 
 114.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, See also Lisa M. 
Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal 
Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 115.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
(2010); see also Andrew Verstein & Roberta Romano, Assessing Dodd-Frank, YALE LAW & ECON. 
RESEARCH PAPER NO. 434 (2011). 
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Recently retired, seasoned executives seem to be able to get up to speed 
quickly and devote the ongoing time.116 
In the for-profit environment, because of increased time demands 
resulting from greater requirements falling on members of audit and 
compensation committees, every director will find it difficult, if not 
impossible, to have the schedule flexibility allowing for concurrent 
service on more than just a few boards. While nonprofit directors should 
not expect to deal with a crisis situation such as a hostile battle for 
corporate control or corporate disasters such as the BP Gulf oil spill,117 
other crisis situations may arise from natural disasters such as hurricanes 
or tornadoes, pandemics, and fires, thus providing the unexpected crisis 
backdrop for a nonprofit board.118 
E. A Passion for the Mission 
In the for-profit world, broad business experience, including 
considerable prior high-level decision making and a demonstrated track 
record of problem solving is an obvious set of primary skills desired for 
every director. However, among nonprofit boards, often the most valuable 
assets are those individuals who have the passion and desire to devote 
their talents and substantial amounts of their time toward achieving the 
organization’s mission. 
F. Strong Interpersonal and Communication Skills 
A major requirement of productive directors is the ability to work 
well with others; and the ability to ask the right penetrating questions at 
the right time, without being disagreeable. These skills can be developed, 
but are not amply present in all. 
G. Importance of Independence 
Actual independence is evidenced by an ability to represent the total 
enterprise interests of the company (as opposed to representing the 
interests of any particular group—for non-management directors, they 
must be independent in fact of management and the organization). In the 
 116.  See Kramer Levin, Kopelman Participates in NACD Directorship Roundtable, 
KRAMERLEVIN (2010), http://www.kramerlevin.com/Kopelman-Participates-in-NACD-
Directorship-Roundtable-04-14-2010/ [https://perma.cc/R5DZ-L9GL]. 
 117.  Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis Governance, 13 HASTINGS 
BUS. L.J. 275 (2017).  
118.  Id. 
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for-profit environment, corporate governance has progressively become 
federalized during the not too distant past as a result of requirements 
imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley119 legislation (in response to fraud at 
Adelphia Communications, Enron, Worldcom, and others) and Dodd-
Frank120 (in response to the 2008–09 financial crisis). Independence is 
now required for members of for-profit audit, compensation, and 
nominating and governance committees.121 
Each nonprofit board should adopt a clearly-written statement 
specifying what constitutes director independence. As an example, here is 
the statement adopted by profit-oriented Texas Instruments: 
The board has adopted the following standards for determining 
independence. 
A. In no event will a director be considered independent if: 
1. He or she is a current partner of or is employed by the company’s
independent auditors; or 
2. An immediate family member of the director is (a) a current partner
of the company’s independent auditors or (b) currently employed by 
the company’s independent auditors and personally works on the 
company’s audit. 
B.  In no event will a director be considered independent if, within the 
preceding three years: 
1. He or she was employed by the company (except in the capacity of
interim chairman of the board, chief executive officer or other 
executive officer) or any of its subsidiaries; 
2. He or she received more than $120,000 during any twelve-month
period in direct compensation from TI (other than (a) director and 
committee fees and pension or other forms of deferred compensation 
and (b) compensation received for former service as an interim 
chairman of the board, chief executive officer or other executive 
officer); 
3. An immediate family member of the director was employed as an
executive officer by the company or any of its subsidiaries; 
4. An immediate family member of the director received more than
$120,000 during any twelve-month period in direct compensation from 
119.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 120.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
(2010). 
121.  See NYSE Euronext Corporate Governance Guidelines (2011). 
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TI (excluding compensation as a non-executive officer employee of the 
company); 
5. He or she was (but is no longer) a partner or employee of the
company’s independent auditors and personally worked on the 
company’s audit within that time; 
6. An immediate family member of the director was (but is no longer)
a partner or employee of the company’s independent auditors and 
personally worked on the company’s audit within that time; 
7. He or she was an executive officer of another company, at which
any of TI’s current executive officers at the same time served on that 
company’s compensation committee; 
8. An immediate family member of the director was an executive
officer of another company at which any of TI’s current executive 
officers at the same time served on that company’s compensation 
committee; 
9. He or she was, and remains at the time of the determination, an
executive officer or employee of a company that made payments to, or 
received payments from, TI for property or services in an amount 
which, in any single fiscal year, exceeded the greater of $1 million or 2 
percent of the other company’s consolidated gross revenues for its last 
completed fiscal year (for purposes of this standard, charitable 
contributions are not considered “payments”); or 
10. An immediate family member of the director was, and remains at
the time of the determination, an executive officer of a company that 
made payments to, or received payments from, TI for property or 
services in an amount which, in any single fiscal year, exceeded the 
greater of $1 million or 2 percent of the other company’s consolidated 
gross revenues for its last completed fiscal year (for purposes of this 
standard, charitable contributions are not considered “payments”). 
C.  Audit Committee members may not accept any consulting, 
advisory or other compensatory fee from TI, other than in their 
capacity as members of the board or any board committee. 
Compensatory fees do not include the receipt of fixed amounts of 
compensation under a retirement plan (including deferred 
compensation) for prior service with TI (provided that such 
compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service). 
D.  The following relationships will not be considered material 
relationships with the company for the purpose of determining director 
independence: 
39
Trautman and Ford: Nonprofit Governance: The Basics
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
1010 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:971 
1. A director is an employee, director or trustee of a charitable
organization and TI or the TI Foundation makes discretionary 
contributions to that organization that are less than the greater of 
$50,000 or 2 percent of the organization’s latest publicly available 
consolidated gross revenue. 
2. A director is an employee, director or trustee of another entity that is
indebted to TI or to which TI is indebted, and the total amount of either 
company’s indebtedness to the other is less than 2 percent of the total 
consolidated assets of the entity he or she serves as an executive officer, 
director or trustee. 
For any other relationship, the determination of whether it is 
material, and consequently whether the director involved is independent, 
will be made by directors who satisfy the independence criteria set forth 
in this section. For purposes of these independence determinations, 
“immediate family member” will have the same meaning as under the 
NYSE rules.122 
H. Soundness of Judgment 
A demonstrated soundness of judgment and effectiveness, as 
evidenced by a pro-active and results oriented approach to problem 
solving, and the ability to make independent, analytical inquiries of 
factual patterns is desired. Also helpful is an interest in and familiarity 
with management theory and best business practices. 
I. Experience Attributes 
Every board should also set forth a statement of desired experience 
attributes for each director candidate. In a typical for-profit setting, these 
might include such characteristics as: 
• General business experience – Possess a general understanding
of elements related to the success of a company like ours in the
current business environment;
• Specific industry knowledge – Possess a reasonable knowledge
about our businesses;
 122.  See Texas Instruments, Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) at 55 (Mar. 7, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/97476/000120677411000437/texasins_def14a.htm 
[http://perma.cc/8CMK-WKPA]. 
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• Financial acumen – Should have a good understanding of
business finance and financial statements;
• Educational and professional background – Should possess a
complementary set of skills within a framework of total board
knowledge base;
• Diversity of background and viewpoint – Bring to the board an
appropriate level of diversity; and
• Other attributes – Provide those special attributes identified as
needed.123
X. BOARD COMPOSITION AND COMMITTEE STRUCTURE 
The business of any corporation is conducted and overseen by its 
board of directors.124 
A. Each Board is Different 
Board composition for nonprofit entities is vastly different from that 
of profit seeking organizations in some respects, and similar in others. The 
needs of a local or national U.S. nonprofit board will differ from 
multinational governance involving global production, marketing, or 
international financing relationships necessary in organizations such as 
Coca-Cola, General Electric, Microsoft, or Pfizer. However, the 
governance skills and lessons learned by corporate directors in such 
organizations may prove to be valuable assets in a nonprofit setting. The 
concerns and issues faced by an entity having international operations, 
such as Doctors Without Borders, are profoundly different from the 
mission of a local Humane Society dealing with the needs of abandoned 
animals. To a considerable extent, a board standing committee structure 
tailored to the specific needs of a nonprofit organization should result in 
best practice. In smaller nonprofits, business may be conducted as a 
committee of the whole, with efficiency increased by providing for 
particularly necessary committees such as audit and nominating and 
governance. Houston director Deborah Cannon advises, “Nonprofits need 
123.  See Trautman, The Matrix, supra note 113 at 87. 
 124.  See Byron F. Egan, How Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases Affect Advice to Directors and 
Officers of Delaware and Texas Corporations, 37th Ann. Conf. on Sec. Reg. & Bus. L. 3 (Feb. 13, 
2015), (citing TBOC § 21.401); TBCA art. 2.31; and DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8 § 141(a) (title 8 of the 
Delaware Code Annotated to be hereinafter referred to as the “DGCL”); CA, Inc. v. AFSCME 
Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008) (Board authority to manage the corporation 
under DGCL § 141(a) may not be infringed by a bylaw adopted by the stockholders under DGCL § 
109 in a manner that restricts the power of directors to exercise their fiduciary duties). 
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to ensure that they have strong boards with diverse backgrounds who 
mirror their organization’s target audience.”125 
B. Board Committee Structure 
In a for-profit setting, many corporations have committees such as 
audit and compensation mandated by regulators and securities listing and 
trading organizations to be composed of independent directors (non-
employees, employee-related, or otherwise compromised).126 The 
standing committee schematic prevalent in most modern for-profit 
organizations consists of the following minimal structure: (1) audit, (2) 
compensation, (3) executive, and (4) nominating and governance.127 This 
is not necessarily so for the nonprofit sector. However, a recent look at 
the organization structure of The United Way Worldwide Board of 
Trustees, having “fiduciary oversight of United Way Worldwide, and . . . 
responsib[ility] for overseeing the business affairs of the organization,” 
discloses: a Board Chair; Secretary of the Board; Treasurer and Chair, 
Finance Committee; Chair, Audit Committee; Chair, Executive 
Compensation Committee; Chair, Membership Accountability 
Committee; Chair, Governance Committee; Chair, Resource 
Development; and Chair, Brand Stewardship.128 
The duties and responsibilities will be specified in charters drafted 
and adopted for each core standing committee. Examples of committee 
charters and experience from the for-profit world may serve as valuable 
templates for nonprofit organizations and are offered in the following 
pages for consideration and to provoke critical thinking. A discussion of 
the typical responsibilities for each of these core standing committees and 
other potentially valuable committees will now be presented along with 
thoughts about relevant nominee considerations. 
 125.  See e-mail from Deborah Cannon, Corporate and nonprofit director, to Lawrence J. 
Trautman (Jan. 26, 2018) (on file with authors). See also Lawrence J. Trautman, Corporate 
Boardroom Diversity: Why Are We Still Talking About This?, 17 SCHOLAR 219 (2015), 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2047750 [https://perma.cc/KPC3-8HWG]. 
126.  See Trautman, The Matrix, supra note 113. 
127.  See Trautman, The Matrix, supra note 113. 
128.  United Way 2016 Annual Report, UNITED WAY, (2018), https://www.unitedway.org/
annual-report/2016 [https://perma.cc/46VD-FNX2]. 
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C. Audit (Risk) Committee 
Financial, tax, and accounting expertise is critical to the governance 
of any nonprofit organization.129 As discussed above, meticulous 
compliance with federal and state laws is critical to maintain a nonprofit 
organization’s tax-exempt status, and thus the tax-deductibility of 
contributions to that organization. Since nonprofit organizations are not 
investment vehicles and thus do not market ownership interests, they fall 
outside of the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed upon 
publicly-held organizations. However, they are still accountable for their 
financial activities, and much of their financial activity is subject to public 
disclosure. Moreover, to the extent that they solicit contributions, many 
nonprofits are subject to state laws requiring licensure prior to fundraising 
solicitations. Therefore, much can be learned about the function of an 
audit committee by looking at how they are structured and operate in SEC-
regulated environments. 
In a for-profit setting, “a board’s audit committee will be a standing 
committee established to comply with the requirements of Section 
 129.  See Christopher P. Agoglia, Timothy Doupnik & George T. Tsakumis, Principles-Based 
Versus Rules-Based Accounting Standards: The Influence of Standard Precision and Audit Committee 
Strength on Financial Reporting Decisions, 86 ACCT. REV. 747 (2011); Robert M. Bushman & Abbie 
J. Smith, Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance, JAE ROCHESTER 
CONFERENCE (2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=253302 [https://perma.cc/R93T-FY79]; Robert M. 
Bushman & Abbie J. Smith, Transparency, Financial Accounting Information, and Corporate 
Governance, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. (2003); Joseph V. Carcello, Carl W. Hollingsworth, April Klein & 
Terry L. Neal, Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, 
and Earnings Management (2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=887512 [https://perma.cc/W7GP-
76FE]; Gin Chong, Detecting Fraud: What Are Auditor’s Responsibilities?, 24(2) J. CORP. ACCT. & 
FIN. 47 (2013); Jeffrey Cohen, Ganesh Krishnamoorthy & Arnold Wright, The Corporate 
Governance Mosaic and Financial Reporting Quality, J. ACCT. LIT. 87 (2004); Aswath Damodaran, 
Risk Management: A Corporate Governance Manual (2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1681017 
[https://perma.cc/U3AN-RWU7]; Gene Imhoff, Accounting Quality, Auditing and Corporate 
Governance, ACCT. HORIZONS SUPP. 117 (2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=374380 
[https://perma.cc/J27Y-65AM]; April Klein, Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, 
and Earnings Management, NYU, Law and Economics Research Paper No. 06-42 
(2000), https://ssrn.com/abstract=246674 [https://perma.cc/T4SB-DWFS]; Ranjani Krishnan, 
Michelle Yetman, Robert Yetman, Financial Disclosure Management by Nonprofit Organizations 
(2002), https://ssrn.com/abstract=319581 [https://perma.cc/G97T-8QDA]; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, The 
Promises and Perils of Using Big Data to Regulate Nonprofits, 94 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3350677 [https://perma.cc/T46G-R663]; Christine Petrovits, Catherine 
Shakespeare & Aimee Shih, The Causes and Consequences of Internal Control Problems in Nonprofit 
Organizations (2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1582765 [https://perma.cc/MQ6Y-MGLN]; 
Douglas F. Prawitt, Jason L Smith & David A. Wood, Internal Audit Quality and Earnings 
Management, 84 ACCT. REV. 1255 (2009); Robert Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate 
Governance: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1157 (2003) Robert Yetman & Michelle Yetman, 
The Effects of Governance on the Accuracy of Charitable Expenses Reported by Nonprofit 
Organizations (2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=590961 [https://perma.cc/5Q7S-QKG4]. 
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3(a)(58)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,130 as amended. All 
members of the audit committee must be independent under the rules of 
the NYSE and the board’s corporate governance guidelines.”131 As 
demonstrated by the Audit Committee Charter for AT&T, the audit 
committee of any public corporation will generally be responsible to: 
“assist the Board in its oversight of: (1) the integrity of the financial 
statements of the Company, (2) the independent auditor’s qualifications 
and independence, (3) the performance of the Company’s internal audit 
function and independent auditors, and (4) the compliance by the 
Company with legal and regulatory requirements.”132 In addition, 
Committee Membership 
At the first meeting of the Board of Directors following each Annual 
Meeting of Stockholders, the Board, after receiving the 
recommendations of the Corporate Governance and Nominating 
Committee, shall appoint the members of the Committee and shall 
determine the Chairperson of the Committee, each to serve at the 
pleasure of the Board. Committee members shall not have a fixed term. 
The Committee shall consist of no fewer than three members, including 
the Chairperson. Each member of the Committee shall meet the 
independence and experience requirements of the listing standards of the 
New York Stock Exchange and the independence requirements of 
Section 10A(m)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
“Exchange Act”) and the rules of the Commission thereunder. The 
Board shall periodically determine (i) whether each Committee member 
meets such independence and experience requirements and (ii) whether 
or not any member of the Committee is an ‘audit committee financial 
expert’ as that term is defined by the rules and regulations of the 
Commission. Committee members may not accept, directly or 
indirectly, any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the 
Company other than in their capacity as a Director. 
Procedures 
The Committee shall meet as often as it determines, but not less than six 
times a year. The Committee shall meet periodically with management, 
the senior internal auditing executive, and the independent auditor in 
separate executive sessions. The Committee may request any officer or 
employee of the Company or the Company’s outside counsel or 
130.  See The Matrix, supra note 113 at 91 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2008)). 
131.  See The Matrix, supra note 113 at 91. 
132.  Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of AT&T, Charter (as amended June 26, 2015), 
INVESTORS.ATT (2015), https://investors.att.com/~/media/Files/A/ATT-IR/committees-and-charters/
audit-committee-charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/529K-TN2H]. 
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independent auditor to attend a meeting of the Committee or to meet 
with any members of, or consultants to, the Committee. After the 
Committee meets or otherwise takes action, it shall, as soon as 
practicable, make a report of its activities at a meeting of the Board. The 
Committee may form and delegate authority to subcommittees when 
determined by the Committee to be necessary or appropriate. 
Committee Authority and Responsibilities 
The Committee shall have the authority, to the extent it deems necessary 
or appropriate, to conduct investigations and to retain independent legal, 
accounting or other advisors. The Committee may authorize and direct 
the payment of compensation by the Company to the independent 
auditor for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or for other 
services and to any advisors employed by the Committee as well as the 
payment of ordinary administrative expenses of the Committee that are 
necessary or appropriate in carrying out its duties. The Committee shall 
review and reassess the adequacy of this Charter annually and 
recommend any proposed changes to the Corporate Governance and 
Nominating Committee. The Committee shall annually evaluate the 
Committee’s own performance and share such evaluation with the 
Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee. 
Oversight of the Company’s Relationship with the Independent 
Auditor 
1. The Committee shall be directly responsible for the
appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of the
work of the independent auditor employed by the Company for
the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or
performing other audit, review or attest services (including
resolution of disagreements between management and the
independent auditor regarding financial reporting). The
independent auditor shall report directly to the Committee.
2. The independent auditor may be engaged by the Company to
perform audit services and, to the extent permitted by
applicable Federal securities laws and rules thereunder, non-
audit services, in each case only where the Committee has pre-
approved each such service, subject to the de minimus
exception for non-audit services described in Section
10A(i)(1)(B) of the Exchange Act. The Committee may either
approve such audit and non-audit services or adopt pre-
approval policies and procedures provided that the policies and
procedures are detailed as to the particular service provided and 
the Committee is informed of each such service. As a part of
such policies and procedures, the Committee may delegate
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authority to subcommittees consisting of one or more members 
to grant pre-approvals of audit and permitted non-audit 
services. 
3. The Committee shall establish policies for the Company’s
hiring of employees or former employees of the independent
auditor.
4. The Committee shall obtain and review a report from the
independent auditor at least annually regarding: (a) the
independent auditor’s internal quality-control procedures, (b)
any material issues raised by the most recent internal quality-
control review, or peer review, of the firm, or by any inquiry or
investigation by governmental or professional authorities
within the preceding five years respecting one or more
independent audits carried out by the firm, (c) any steps taken
to deal with any such issues, and (d) all relationships between
the independent auditor and the Company. After reviewing the
foregoing report and the independent auditor’s work during the
year, the Committee shall evaluate the qualifications,
performance and independence of the independent auditor,
taking into account the opinions of management and the senior
internal auditing executive. As a part of this evaluation, the
Committee shall review and evaluate the performance and
qualifications of the lead partner of the independent auditor.
5. The Committee shall, as appropriate, discuss with management
the timing and process for the rotation of the lead audit partner,
the concurring partner and any other active audit engagement
team partner and consider whether, in order to assure
continuing auditor independence, it is appropriate to rotate the
independent auditing firm.
6. The Committee shall meet with the independent auditor prior
to the audit to discuss the planning and staffing of the audit.
Financial Statement and Disclosure Matters 
7. The Committee shall review and discuss with management and
the independent auditor . . . the annual audited financial
statements . . . . 
8. The Committee shall review and discuss with management and
the independent auditor . . . the quarterly financial
statements. . . . and the results of the independent auditor’s
review of the quarterly financial statements [not applicable if
quarterly reports are not required].
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9. The Committee shall periodically review and discuss with
management and the independent auditor: (a) any major issues
regarding accounting principles and financial statement
presentations, including any significant changes in the
Company’s selection or application of accounting principles,
and major issues as to the adequacy of the Company’s internal
controls and any special audit steps adopted in light of material
control deficiencies; (b) analyses prepared by management
and/or the independent auditor setting forth significant
financial reporting issues and judgments made in connection
with the preparation of the financial statements, including
analyses of the effects of alternative GAAP methods on the
financial statements; and (c) the effect of regulatory and
accounting initiatives, as well as off-balance sheet structures,
on the financial statements of the Company.
10. The Committee shall review and discuss with management and
the independent auditor reports from the independent auditor
on:
a. All critical accounting policies and practices to be used;
b. All alternative treatments of financial information within generally
accepted accounting principles that have been discussed with 
management, ramifications of the use of such alternative disclosures and 
treatments, and the treatment preferred by the independent auditor; and 
c. Other material written communications between the independent
auditor and management, such as any management letter or schedule of 
unadjusted differences. 
11. The Committee shall review and discuss with management the
Company’s earnings press releases as well as financial
information and earnings guidance provided to analysts and
rating agencies. Such discussion may be done generally (i.e.,
discussion of the types of information to be disclosed and the
type of presentation to be made). The Committee need not
discuss in advance each earnings release or each instance in
which the Company may provide earnings guidance.
12. The Committee shall review and discuss with management the
Company’s major financial risk exposures and the steps
management has taken to monitor and control such exposures,
including the Company’s risk assessment and risk management
policies. This would include, among other matters, evaluating
risk in the context of financial policies, counterparty and credit
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risk, and the appropriate mitigation of risk, including through 
the use of insurance where appropriate. 
13. The Committee shall annually discuss with the independent
auditor the matters required to be discussed by Auditing
Standard No. 16, Communications with Audit Committees,
including any difficulties encountered in the course of the audit
work, any restrictions on the scope of activities or access to
requested information, and any significant disagreements with
management. The discussion shall address, to the extent
applicable, any accounting adjustments that were noted or
proposed by the independent auditor but were “passed” (as
immaterial or otherwise), any communications between the
audit team and the auditor’s national office with respect to
auditing or accounting issues presented by the engagement and
any “management” or “internal control” letter issued, or
proposed to be issued, by the independent auditor.
14. The Committee shall review disclosures made to the
Committee by the Company’s Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer . . . about significant deficiencies or
material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting and any fraud involving
management or other employees who have a significant role in
the Company’s internal control over financial reporting. The
Committee shall review with management, the senior internal
auditing executive, and the independent auditor, as appropriate, 
attestations and reports by the independent auditor on internal
control over financial reporting.
Oversight of the Company’s Internal Audit Function 
15. The Committee shall review with management the
appointment and replacement of the senior internal auditing
executive and shall annually evaluate his or her performance.
The Committee shall provide the senior internal auditing
executive with access to communicate personally and directly
with the members of the Audit Committee at any time on any
auditing or internal control matter.
16. The Committee shall review with the senior internal auditing
executive the significant reports to management prepared by
the internal auditing department and management’s responses.
17. The Committee shall review with the senior internal auditing
executive, the independent auditor and management the
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internal audit department responsibilities, budget and staffing 
and the internal audit plan for the coming year. 
Compliance Oversight Responsibilities 
18. The Committee shall obtain from the independent auditor
assurance that Section 10A(b) of the Exchange Act (relating to
reports by the independent auditor made to the Company of
illegal acts discovered by the independent auditor) has not been
implicated.
19. The Committee shall establish procedures for the receipt,
retention and treatment of complaints received by the Company 
regarding accounting, internal accounting controls or auditing
matters, and the confidential, anonymous submission by
employees or other interested persons, of concerns regarding
questionable accounting or auditing matters.
20. The Committee shall discuss with management and the
independent auditor any correspondence with regulators or
governmental agencies and any published reports made known
to AT&T’s executive officers that raise material issues
regarding the Company’s financial statements or accounting
policies.
21. The Committee shall discuss with the Company’s General
Counsel any significant legal, compliance or regulatory matters 
that may have a material impact on the financial statements or
the Company’s compliance policies.
22. The Committee shall meet periodically, but no less than
annually, with the Company’s Chief Compliance Officer
(“CCO”) regarding the CCO’s assessment of the Company’s
compliance and ethics risks, the effectiveness of the
Company’s Corporate Compliance Program, and any other
compliance related matters that either the Committee or the
CCO deems appropriate. The Committee shall provide the
CCO with access to communicate personally and directly with
the members of the Audit Committee at any time on any matter
of compliance and ethics. The Committee shall oversee the
administration and enforcement of the Company’s Code of
Business Conduct, Code of Ethics and Corporate Compliance
Program.
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Other 
23. The Committee shall be responsible for any other matters
expressly delegated to the Committee by the Board from time
to time.
Limitation of Committee’s Role 
While the Committee has the responsibilities and powers set forth in this 
Charter, it is not the duty of the Committee to plan or conduct audits or 
to determine that the Company’s financial statements and disclosures 
are complete and accurate and are in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles and applicable rules and regulations. These are the 
responsibilities of management and the independent auditor.133 
D. The Financial Expert 
A nonprofit’s audit committee will likely be best chaired by a 
director who brings many years of independent accounting, auditing, and 
tax experience. Lessons gained from actual audit experience such as 
statistical sampling and other audit methodologies and a familiarity with 
and understanding of highly technical emerging accounting issues is 
valuable in understanding the audit function.134 
E. Compensation Committee 
Board compensation committees exist to ensure that executive 
compensation comports with performance and is aligned with 
marketplace requirements without being unduly excessive.135 The 
efficient operation of a for-profit board compensation committee will 
serve to provide the enterprise with motivated executives whereby 
compensation is tied to performance, thus staving off reputation damage 
caused by reports in the press alleging excessive and improper levels of 
compensation. Examples of such legal actions include allegations of 
excessive compensation and perks received previously in the New York 
United Way case.136 Under Texas law, officer and director compensation 
133.  Id. 
134.  See The Matrix, supra note 113 at 93. 
135.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1615 (2005); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 
30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005). 
136.  See supra note 39. 
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in nonprofit corporations may present issues of conflict of interest.137 
Regarding compensation issues, Byron Egan writes: 
[S]ince non-profit corporations often seek to qualify for exemption from 
federal income taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1986, as amended (the ‘IRC’), as organizations organized and 
operated exclusively for charitable, religious, literary or scientific 
purposes and whose earnings do not inure to the benefit of any private 
shareholders or individuals, the compensation of directors and officers 
of non-profit corporations can be subject to scrutiny by the Internal 
Revenue Service (‘IRS’). Excessive compensation can be deemed the 
sort of private inurement that could cause the organization to lose its 
 137.  See Byron F. Egan, How Recent Fiduciary Duty Cases Affect Advice to Directors and 
Officers of Delaware and Texas Corporations, 37th Ann. Conf. on Sec. Reg. & Bus. L. (Feb. 13, 2015) 
at 178, citing TBOC § 22.230 of the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act and provides as follows:  
Section 22.230. Contracts or Transactions Involving Interested Directors, Officers, and 
Members. 
a) This section applies only to a contract or transaction between a corporation
and: 
1) One or more of the corporation’s directors, officers, or members; or 
2) An entity or other organization in which one or more of the corporation’s 
directors, officers, or members:
(A) Is a managerial official or a member; or
(B) Has a financial interest. 
b) An otherwise valid contract or transaction is valid notwithstanding that a di-
rector, officer, or member of the corporation is present at or participates in the 
meeting of the board of directors, of a committee of the board, or of the mem-
bers that authorizes the contract or transaction, or votes to authorize the con-
tract or transaction, if: 
1) The material facts as to the relationship or interest and as to the contract
or transaction are disclosed to or known by:
(A) The corporation’s board of directors, a committee of the board of
directors, or the members in good faith and with ordinary care au-
thorize the contract or transaction by the affirmative vote of the ma-
jority of the disinterested directors, committee members or mem-
bers, regardless of whether the disinterested directors, committee 
members or members constitute a quorum; or 
(B) The members entitled to vote on the authorization of the contract or 
transaction, and the contract or transaction is specifically approved 
in good faith and with ordinary care by a vote of the members; or 
2) The contract or transaction is fair to the corporation when the contract or 
transaction is authorized, approved, or ratified by the board of directors,
a committee of the board of directors, or the members. 
c) Common or interested directors or members of a corporation may be included
in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board, a committee
of the board, or members that authorizes the contract or transaction. 
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status as an exempt organization under the IRC and subject the recipient 
to penalties and other sanctions under the IRC.138 
F. Critical Domain Expertise 
In a for-profit setting, if your product is semiconductor chips, you 
expect to have semiconductor engineering and manufacturing expertise 
and experience represented on your board. If your product is computer 
software, then software engineering expertise is a necessity. Accordingly, 
if the mission of your nonprofit organization is to eradicate a certain 
disease like ebola, the medical expertise germane to your stated mission 
is required in abundance on your board. If your mission is subject to 
cultural and political constraints imposed by the geographical and 
political environment existing in vast spaces of the African continent, then 
your board decision process should benefit from experience and expertise 
in the relevant regional dynamics. Assessing whether you have too much 
or not enough of this critical domain expertise represented on a nonprofit 
board of directors will likely be an organizational challenge. In many 
nonprofit organizations, laser focus on critical domain expertise at the 
expense of appropriate audit committee or compensation committee 
experience and background will introduce excessive risk to all involved. 
G. Executive Committee 
In order for the enterprise to exercise the powers of the Board to 
direct the business and affairs of the organization between meetings of the 
Board, an executive committee is typically empowered. For example, 
composition of this committee might consist of the Chairman of the board 
and Chairpersons of all standing committees. Important considerations for 
membership on this committee will be the ability of members to be 
available on short notice (physical proximity) and other measures of 
actual availability. AT&T’s Executive Committee Charter, in relevant 
part, follows: 
Committee Membership 
Except as otherwise provided by the Board of Directors, the members 
of the Committee shall be the Chairman of the Board and the 
Chairpersons of each of the Audit, Corporate Development and Finance, 
Corporate Governance and Nominating, Public Policy and Corporate 
Reputation, and Human Resources Committees. The Chairman of the 
 138.  See id at 179 (citing Rpt. on Exempt Organizations Executive Compensation Compliance 
Project  ̶  Parts I and II, March, 2007). 
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Board shall also act as the Chairman of the Committee. Upon election 
as the Chairman of the Board or the Chairperson of any of the foregoing 
Committees, a Director shall automatically become a member of this 
Committee (and Chairman of the Committee in the case of the Chairman 
of the Board) and shall serve until such person no longer holds a 
qualifying position or the person otherwise resigns or is removed by the 
Board from his or her position with this Committee. Committee 
members shall not have a fixed term. 
Procedures 
The Committee shall meet as often as it determines. The Committee may 
request any officer or employee of the Company to attend a meeting of 
the Committee or to meet with any consultant to the Committee. After 
the Committee meets or otherwise takes action, it shall, as soon as 
practicable, make a report of its activities at a meeting of the Board. The 
Committee may form and delegate authority to subcommittees when 
determined by the Committee to be necessary or appropriate. 
Committee Responsibilities and Authority 
The Committee shall have the authority to exercise all the power and 
authority of the Board of Directors, to the extent permitted by law, 
during the intervals between meetings of the Board . . . .139 
H. Nominating and Governance Committee 
Although crafted for application in a for-profit setting, the Kimberly-
Clark Corporation’s Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee 
Charter has material application to a nonprofit organization as well. 
Accordingly, Kimberly-Clark’s N&G committee is responsible to: 
periodically review and reassess the adequacy of this charter and 
recommend any proposed changes of the charter to the Board for 
approval. The Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee, in 
consultation with the Chairman of the Board, shall recommend members 
for appointment to, and the Chairman of, the Nominating and Corporate 
Governance Committee to the Board for its approval. The Nominating 
and Corporate Governance Committee shall be comprised of at least 
three directors, each of whom is independent of management and the 
 139.  Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of AT&T, Charter (as amended April 27, 
2012), INVESTORS.ATT (2012) https://investors.att.com/~/media/Files/A/ATT-IR/committees-and-
charters/executive-committee-charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5AY-FLKJ]. 
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Corporation. The Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee 
shall maintain minutes of its meetings and report to the Board.140 
In terms of policy, the Kimberly-Clark N&G committee is charged with 
the responsibility to: 
(1) oversee the process by which individuals are nominated to become 
board members; 
(2) oversee matters of corporate governance, including advising the 
Board on matters of: 
(A) board organization, membership and function; and 
(B) committee structure and membership; and 
(3) oversee matters relating to sustainability, corporate social 
responsibilities and corporate citizenship. 
The Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee shall have the 
authority to retain special legal, accounting or other consultants to 
advise the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee and to 
assist it identifying suitable potential board nominees. The Nominating 
and Corporate Governance Committee may request any officer or 
employee of the Corporation or the Corporation’s outside counsel to 
attend a meeting of the Nominating and Corporate Governance 
Committee or to meet with any members of, or consultants to, the 
Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee.141 
I. Succession Planning 
Succession planning is a necessary governance task facing every 
enterprise. Nonprofits are no exception. Many smaller nonprofits may not 
have the benefit of a management team deep in redundant talent. This 
makes the death or disability of a chief executive officer particularly 
problematic. An annual discussion of what the organization might do in 
the event of the loss of key people or assets may prove exceedingly 
important as the board considers future governance and management 
needs. 
 140.  Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Charter, Kimberly-Clark Corporation 
(as amended through Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.kimberly-clark.com/en/investors/corporate-
governance [https://perma.cc/89GK-S9ZF]. 
141.  Id. 
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J. Marketing Expertise: Particularly Social Media 
Social media marketing is of vital importance to any enterprise these 
days, and may be more than a mystery to nonprofit boards comprised 
mostly of those ages 40 or older. In terms of how today is different from 
just five years ago, Houston director Deborah Cannon states, “social 
media has made it far easier to get a nonprofit’s message out there. But 
that also means that there are far more people writing about their 
experiences. Thus, a less than perfect experience or false information gets 
wide exposure . . . organizations need to closely monitor what is out 
there.”142 
In the following example, the identity of the specific entity involved 
is disguised. Professor Trautman recalls the story told by a marketing 
friend of a nonprofit operating a major historical landmark [think Historic 
Williamsburg, the historic mansions of Newport, Rhode Island, or a 
famous botanical garden; none of these are the actual subject of this 
example]. Because admission is relatively pricey, as might be suspected, 
the primary demographic of those visiting this attraction for many years 
has been affluent tourists and those within commuting distance, either at 
or nearing retirement age. Accordingly, the primary traditional customer 
base is in the process of dying off and must somehow be replaced with 
much younger visitors (often much less affluent). How to solve this 
marketing dilemma? 
As might be expected, how to reach millennial, gen x, gen y, or 
whatever the various components of the under-40 demographic may be 
described is a major topic of discussion among management and the board 
of this prominent nonprofit. Consider that Instagram provides its 800 
million worldwide users with a fun and creative way to capture, edit and 
share photographs, messages, and videos, either publicly or privately, 
with pre-approved followers.143 For the year 2017, Instagram discloses the 
following list of most-followed celebrities: 
1. Selena Gomez (130+ million followers)
2. Christiano Ronaldo (116+ million followers)
3. Ariana Grande (115+ million followers)
 142.  See e-mail from Deborah Cannon, Corporate and nonprofit director, to Lawrence J. 
Trautman (Jan. 26, 2018) (on file with authors). See also Lawrence J. Trautman & Oliver W. Aho, 
Crowdfunding, Entrepreneurship, and Start-Up Finance, Entrepreneur & Innovation Exchange (EiX) 
(2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3251538 [https://perma.cc/A2U8-KD9M] (for a discussion of 
crowdfunding and use of social media). 
 143.  See Instagram, INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/A8C8-
HU8L]. 
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4. Beyoncé (108+ million followers)
5. Kim Kardashian West (104+ million followers)
6. Taylor Swift (104+ million followers)
7. Kylie Jenner (99.5+ million followers)
8. Dwayne Johnson (96+ million followers)
9. Justin Bieber (93.9+ million followers)
10. Kendall Jenner (84.8+ million followers)144
And now we describe the missed opportunity at this nonprofit 
because management didn’t have a plan in place to understand and capture 
the wonder of social media. Unannounced, one of the above celebrities, 
along with this celebrity’s entourage pays a visit to our example tourist 
attraction and immediately starts sharing their enjoyable visit with 
approximately 100 million followers. Someone on staff at the admissions 
gate recognizes their famous guest and immediately informs management. 
Because management presumably didn’t recognize this great promotional 
opportunity, employees were instructed not to approach the celebrity until 
“marketing can figure out what to do.” You guessed it, by the time 
marketing and management figured out what to do, the famous guest 
along with their 100 million followers had left the property. Contrast this 
result with the celebrity’s next stop down the road where they were 
embraced with refreshments, free products, open arms, and proceeded to 
spend the afternoon showing the 100 million followers what a wonderful 
time he/she was having with the new host’s product. The dollar value of 
this endorsement, broadcast with big smiles from the celebrity, is beyond 
estimation. Understanding internet marketing, social media, mobile 
platforms, and the culture of sub-40 year olds is not a skill or deep 
experience held by many above the age of 40.145 For most nonprofit 
organizations, these skills critically need to be represented in governance 
discussions.146 
 144.  See Instagram’s 2017 Year in Review, INSTAGRAM-PRESS (2017), https://instagram-
press.com/blog/2017/11/29/instagrams-2017-year-in-review/ [https://perma.cc/8VZK-XE3P]. 
 145.  See Trautman, et al., supra note 34; See also David Adam Friedman, Bringing Candor to 
Charitable Solicitations, MD. L. REV. (forthcoming); Chao Guo & Gregory D. Saxton, Tweeting 
Social Change: How Social Media are Changing Nonprofit Advocacy, 43(1) NONPROFIT & VOLUN. 
SECTOR Q. 57 (2014); Kristen Lovejoy & Gregory D. Saxton, Information, Community, and Action: 
How Nonprofit Organizations Use Social Media, 17(3) J. Computer-Mediated Comm. 337 (2012); 
Gregory D. Saxton & Lili Wang, The Social Network Effect: The Determinants of Giving through 
Social Media, 43 NONPROFIT & VOLUN. SECTOR Q. 850 (2014); Weiai Wayne Xu & Gregory D. 
Saxton, Does Stakeholder Engagement Pay Off on Social Media? A Social Capital Perspective, 
NONPROFIT & VOLUN. SECTOR Q. (forthcoming). 
 146.  See Ahmed Abdel Moamen, An Actor-Based Middleware for Crowd-Sourced Services, 
3(8) EAI Endorsed Transactions on Mobile Communications and Applications (2017). 
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XI. ENGINEERING NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE SUCCESS
During the next few pages we present a methodology to assist a self-
assessment of organizational leadership strengths and weaknesses. An 
exhaustive treatment of this topic is not possible in the space allowed for 
this article. However, we hope that our brief discussion and analysis 
template will prove useful to nonprofit boards as they seek to structure a 
more rewarding future for themselves. 
A. Talent Inventory and Search Matrix 
What then are the most important attributes needed in director 
candidates for a nonprofit’s particular situation? Assuming that all 
director candidates meet the common criteria of required personal 
attributes (high standards of ethical behavior; time availability; 
outstanding achievement in the individual’s personal and professional 
life; possession of strong interpersonal and communication skills; 
independence; and soundness of judgment), we can then proceed to use a 
blank matrix as a framework for analyzing specific needs. Our talent 
inventory and search matrix presented as Exhibit 7, represents a two-step 
process. The first stage involves a comprehensive discussion among the 
board as to which talents and experiences are mission critical to achieve 
top enterprise governance. This exercise is conducted within the context 
of prioritizing the perceived importance of these various talents. As 
needed skills are identified, they can be added to the matrix and moved 
up and down the vertical axis as a result of debating and determining 
relative importance. Second, an inventory of the skills and experiences of 
existing board members is undertaken. Thus, after defining existing and 
desired people strengths, Exhibit 7 will hopefully assist with board 
discussions aimed at identifying needed skills and in candidate selection. 
The matrix methodology facilitates discussion as you seek to define 
the experience and skills wish list that is important to the organization’s 
future success. It may be as simple as moving yellow Post-it notes on a 
wall to enable moving and repositioning of each skill-set to determine an 
agreement of relative importance. The discussion of must-have skills may 
also help determine board size. Presented below is a logic road-map that 
might be utilized to assess needs and recruit directors having the skills and 
experience that will help to optimize composition of the new board. 
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B. The Chair and CEO Roles Are Separate 
A threshold issue is separation of the board chair role from that of 
CEO—they are two demanding jobs. In recognition of the importance of 
this issue in a for-profit, reporting company setting, Section 972 of Dodd-
Frank legislation signed into law on July 21, 2010, requires disclosure as 
to whether the same individual serves as both CEO and Chairman of the 
board and why or why not.147 For most high-performance enterprises there 
are two full-time jobs represented by the CEO position and the distinct 
function of running the board, which falls to a Lead Director or non-
executive chair.148 
C. The Audit (Risk) Committee Challenge 
From our prior discussion of must have skills and experience, we 
know that at least one, maybe two, and preferably three audit committee 
candidates who qualify as financial experts are optimal. In a for-profit, 
publicly-traded company, one director must qualify as a financial expert. 
This also seems like an important attribute for a nonprofit as well. If two 
directors qualify as financial experts, then an audit committee vice chair 
position may be filled for succession purposes, and three qualified 
individuals will bring even more strength to the board’s audit committee. 
Trautman and Altenbaumer-Price have also suggested that the Audit 
Committee (in the absence of a risk committee) may be the appropriate 
place to exercise corporate governance of Information Technology (IT), 
with appropriate IT skills and experience needing to be considered.149 
Such an approach to filling these audit committee needs will allow for 
directors to amass years in service (particularly helpful in building an 
understanding of the most important audit issues facing an enterprise). In 
addition, having directors in various age categories will help to provide 
for orderly education as to company board mechanics and succession. The 
 147.  See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 972 
(2010). 
 148.  See David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Chairman and CEO: The Controversy Over Board 
Leadership Structure ROCK CTR. FOR CORP. GOV., Stanford University Closer Look Series, Corporate 
Governance Research Initiative (2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/publications/
chairman-ceo-controversy-over-board-leadership-structure [https://perma.cc/25PR-D5MM].  
 149.  See Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Board’s Responsibility for 
Information Technology Governance, 28 JOHN MARSHALL J. OF COMP. & INFOR. LAW, 313 (2011). 
See also Andrea H. Tapia, Louis-Marie Ngamassi Tchouakeu, Edgar Maldonado & Carleen F. 
Maitland, Crossing Borders, Organizations, Levels, and Technologies: IS Collaboration in 
Humanitarian Action, 9(1) INFO. TECH. & INT’L DEV. 1 (Spring 2013). 
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advent of new technologies such as blockchain150 and quantum 
computing151 also require additional board governance skills and 
experience. 
D. The Cyber Threat 
Only within the past few decades have cyber threats grown to 
become a major problem for every enterprise.152 The governance of 
enterprise data and cyber vulnerabilities is perhaps the most difficult 
challenge facing boards everywhere.153 At the same time, the acute 
shortage of computer engineers who have prior governance experience 
combine to make these talents exceedingly difficult to identify and recruit. 
 150.  See Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky, A Primer for Blockchain, 88 UMKC L. 
Rev. (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3324660 [https://perma.cc/G9AU-UCXW]; Walter G. 
Johnson, Blockchain Meets Genomics: Governance Considerations for Promoting Food Safety and 
Public Health, J. FOOD L. & POL’Y (Forthcoming). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3344839 
[https://perma.cc/9RVR-7P2F]. 
 151.  See Walter G. Johnson, Governance Tools for the Second Quantum Revolution, 59 
JURIMETRICS (2019). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3350830 [https://perma.cc/E5MB-77AE]. 
 152.  See David F. Larcker, Peter C. Reiss & Brian Tayan, Critical Update Needed: 
Cybersecurity Expertise in the Boardroom ROCK CTR. FOR CORP. GOV., Stanford University Closer 
Look Series, Corporate Governance Research Initiative (2016), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/
sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-69-cybersecurity-experise-boardroom.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CHR7-ABFU]; David D. Schein & Lawrence J. Trautman, The Dark Web and 
Employer Liability, 18(1) Colo. Tech. L.J. (2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3251479 
[https://perma.cc/N95N-AYRP]; Lawrence J. Trautman, Jason Triche & James C. Wetherbe, 
Corporate Information Technology Governance Under Fire, 8 J. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 105 
(2013); Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & 
POL’Y 341 (2015); Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight: Who’s Who & 
How It Works, 5 J. L. & CYBER WARFARE 147 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack The 
Next Pearl Harbor?, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 232 (2016). 
 153.  See Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing Cyberthreat, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 230 
(2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google Perceives Customer Privacy, Cyber, E-commerce, 
Political and Regulatory Compliance Risks (2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3067298 
[https://perma.cc/3LYG-LUVC]; Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber 
Vulnerabilities: Lessons from Stuxnet and the Internet of Things, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761 (2018); 
Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, The SEC & The Internet: Regulating the Web of Deceit, 
68 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. RPT. 262 (2014); Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce and Electronic 
Payment System Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 17 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261 (2016); Lawrence J. 
Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial Services?, 69 CONSUMER 
FIN. L.Q. RPT. 232 (2016). 
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Examples of major cyber breaches abound.154 Exhibit 2 illustrates the 
growing number of cyber breach incidents per year.155 
Exhibit 2 
Source: Risk Based Security, Inc. (2018) 
Just as the raw number of cyber breach incidents grows every year, 
so too does the corresponding cost to consumers and all within society. 
As a proxy for the continued growth in injury to consumers due to cyber 
breach, Exhibit 3 shows the Number of Records Exposed by Year (in 
millions).156 
 154.  See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Corporate Directors’ and Officers’ 
Cybersecurity Standard of Care: The Yahoo Data Breach, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1231, 1290 (2017) 
(examples of major cyber breaches). 
 155.  See Risk Based Security, Data Breach QuickView Report, Year End 2017, 5, (2018) 
https://www.rpsins.com/media/2884/mc_0000634a-yearendreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/A67N-
2B7G]. 
156.  Id. 
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Exhibit 3 
Source: Risk Based security, Inc. (2018) 
Although often not large enough to reach the headlines of most 
newspapers, a brief sample of reported nonprofit organization breaches 
are depicted in Exhibit 4.157 
 157.  See Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/
data-breaches?title=&org_type%5B%5D=263&taxonomy_vocabulary_11_tid%5B%
5D=2436&taxonomy_vocabulary_11_tid%5B%5D=2434 [https://perma.cc/2ATR-Q24N]. 
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Exhibit 4 
Data Breach Examples Among Nonprofits 
Organization Date Made Public Location 
What Happened 
(Records Breached) 
Pension Fund of 
The Christian 
Church 01/16/2018 
Indianapolis, 
Indiana 
Names, SSN, 
financial account or 
credit or debit card 
numbers . . 
.breached 
SAY San Diego 12/28/2017 
San Diego, 
California 
A citizen returned 
some paper files to 
their office that 
were found in a 
filing cabinet 
purchased from a 
salvage store 
Walk in the World 
Ministries 07/13/2017 Elgin, Illinois 
Nonprofit notified 
by third party e-
commerce provider 
of potential breach 
of credit card, debit 
card, or checking 
account information 
used to receive and 
process donations 
YMCA of San 
Diego 07/12/2017 
San Diego, 
California 
Excel spreadsheet 
containing personal 
information of 
certain YMCA 
employees was 
inadvertently sent 
over email to 
certain YMCA 
employees 
Veterans of 
Foreign Wars of 
the United States 04/11/2014 
Kansas City, 
Missouri 
Hacker, thought to 
be in China, was 
able to download 
tables containing 
names, addresses, 
SSNs, of 
approximately 
55,000 VFW 
members 
Source: Privacy Rights Clearing House (2018) 
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While a detailed discussion of cyber enterprise risk management far 
exceeds the scope of this article, some useful resources are listed below.158 
A helpful explanation of a way to think about the management of 
cybersecuritry, The Profit-Maximizing Model of Security,159 is presented 
by professors Ormerod and Trautman in Exhibit 5. 
Exhibit 5 
The Ormerod-Trautman Profit-Maximizing Model of Security160 
Here, at the leftmost point on the curve, enterprise data security is so 
abysmal that few, if any, users trust the enterprise with their Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII), therefore rendering the profitability or 
efficiency of the enterprise’s data security function a nullity. To 
paraphrase, zero security measures as shown at the bottom left-hand side 
of the graph result in zero users and, therefore zero profitability 
(efficiency). But, as the enterprise security improves, an increasing 
number of users trust the enterprise with their PII and the risk of data 
breach and loss of users’ PII decreases, both of which contribute to 
increased profitability (efficiency). At a point where the number of users 
is maximized, increased security measures (spending on cybersecurity) 
result in limiting the usability of the data/website and thus decrease 
profitability (efficiency). Thus, taken to an extreme, excessive security 
measures may, theoretically, drive usability to the point of futility, 
 158.  See Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, WannaCry, Ransomware, and the 
Emerging Threat to Corporations, 86 TENN. L. REV. (2019). Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara 
Altenbaumer-Price, D&O Insurance: A Primer, 1 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 337 (2012).  
 159.  See Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 155 at 1290. See also Peter C. Ormerod, Ormerod, 
Peter, A Private Enforcement Remedy for Information Misuse, 60 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
160.  Id. 
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achieving no additional benefit from the next dollar spent on cybersecurity 
and decreasing utility of additional spending. For nonprofits, the 
Ormerod-Trautman Model can be rephrased to illustrate the cost-
minimizing level of security, as shown in Exhibit 6.161 
Exhibit 6 
Ormerod-Trautman Nonprofit Cost-Minimizing Model of Security 
As professor Ormerod explains: 
Here, on the left, cyber services are costly due to the threat of litigation 
and penalties; on the right, cyber services are costly because they are 
prohibitively difficult to use and cost money to generate / host. This re-
conception allows nonprofits and governments to express security 
within the confines of a dollar amount.162 
The critical takeaway is that little or no digital security may be just 
as damaging to an enterprise’s financial health as implementing overly 
excessive security. Professors Trautman and Ormerod further observe: 
As this area of the law develops and matures in the coming years, courts, 
regulators, shareholders, and commentators will increasingly view the 
relationship between data security and [enterprise efficiency] as 
described in [Exhibits 5 and 6 herein]. Perhaps the most important 
161.  See Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 155. 
 162.  See Notes from discussion between professor Peter C. Ormerod & Lawrence J. Trautman 
(Feb. 12, 2018) (on file with authors). 
Co
st
Security
Cost-Minimizing Model of Security
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implication of embracing the relationship depicted in the [Ormerod-
Trautman model] is that there is a profit-maximization [or cost effective] 
amount of security. And, as this view of the relationship between 
security and profitability is embraced, there can be little doubt that the 
various constituencies of stakeholders will increasingly expect corporate 
officers and directors to actively seek their company’s profit-
maximizing level of data security.163 
E. Capacity Expansion 
In a philanthropic organization, lessons learned from prior successful 
fundraising experience are often considered a premium skill desired for 
board members. Raising money and cultivating mission support from like-
minded community members is a difficult task, particularly in a difficult 
economy. Board of directors candidates who have been down this road 
before may prove particularly useful additions to any organization. Within 
recent years, knowledge and experience with social media marketing is 
also highly valuable as discussed above. 
 F. The Mission Critical Challenge 
Populating a board with directors having the skills and experience 
unique to the primary mission of the nonprofit is essential. Here, we will 
logically seek to draw upon those candidates who have successfully 
guided other enterprises from our board’s stage of development to 
leadership in the organization’s desired future setting. We want to ensure 
that represented on our board is ample understanding of those factors 
which will determine success in the organization’s mission and allow the 
board to play a supportive and visionary role in monitoring operations, 
management, and assisting in crafting strategy for success. If our stated 
mission is to provide healthcare clinics to underserved inner city 
communities, our board will probably be well served with several 
physician directors having actual experience serving this type of 
community need. If we determine that drug abuse is a major problem, then 
a social worker with on-point experience may prove optimal. 
G. The Governance Challenge 
Serving competently on a board requires understanding of a 
considerable body of enterprise (corporate) governance knowledge. Novel 
and disruptive technological innovations create a constant challenge to 
163.  See Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 155. 
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those seeking to govern any enterprise.164 Corporate governance is a 
legally-intensive endeavor. An understanding of the legal foundation of 
corporate governance is a requisite for the knowledgeable discharge of 
fiduciary duties and responsibilities owed by each director. Therefore, 
each director must understand the duties of care and loyalty as refined 
over the years by developments in relevant case law and the regulatory 
impact brought about by relevant regulation. While non-attorneys may 
grow to understand the ramifications of these laws through years of board 
service with the education and guidance provided by proximity to skilled 
legal counsel, people are not born understanding the role and constraints 
surrounding the discharge of these duties and responsibilities. 
Accordingly, years of progressively responsible enterprise governance 
experience will be a valuable attribute of attractive candidates. It is no 
wonder that approximately 27 percent of all directors serving on Texas 
for-profit corporate boards have a legal background.165 More about 
corporate governance may be learned from the National Association of 
Corporate Directors (NACD).166 
H. Matrix Analysis 
The matrix template included as Exhibit 7 is a first step toward a 
needs analysis for any nonprofit board. For this example, involving a 
hypothetical non-profit board for an inner-city healthcare clinic, we start 
with an inventory of current board members. Use of this assessment tool 
will hopefully result in productive discussions about needed skills and 
experience, producing the start of a plan for optimal candidate 
recruitment. In our example, it may be reasonable to seek three audit 
committee members who will each qualify as a financial expert. As a 
starting search criterion, director candidates having drug addiction 
treatment, social media marketing, and legal experience is desired. With 
 164.  See Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky, A Primer for Blockchain, 88(1) UMKC 
L. REV. (2019); Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies and the Struggle of Law and 
Regulation to Keep Pace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447 (2018); Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin C. Harrell, 
Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041 (2017); 
Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies: Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, 
and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2014). 
 165.  See Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Sits on Texas Corporate Boards?, Texas Corporate 
Directors: Who They Are and What They Do, 16 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 44 (2016); Lawrence J. 
Trautman, Anthony “Tony” Luppino & Malika S. Simmons, Some Key Things U.S. Entrepreneurs 
Need to Know About The Law and Lawyers, 46 TEX. J. BUS. L. 155 (2016) (many entrepreneurial 
considerations are desirable and transferable to a nonprofit enterprise). 
 166.  Lawrence J. Trautman, Present at the Creation: Reflections on the Early Years of the 
National Association of Corporate Directors, 17 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1 (2015). 
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several members of the board of directors no longer available to serve, a 
significant opportunity exists to recruit needed talent and experience and 
to expand the size and scope of the new board. 
1. Continuing CEO and Director #1
Our first continuing director is also one of our founding board 
members. She is a medical doctor and business school graduate. She 
enjoys the challenge of day-to-day operations, welcomes the ability to 
grow the enterprise & seems up to the task. 
2. Continuing Director #2: Medical Doctor
Our next continuing director is a highly-regarded medical doctor 
who has been responsible for launching a number of inner-city community 
projects, including a food bank. He is an internal medicine doctor by 
training and his network of relationships in this space should remain a 
major enterprise asset. 
3. Non-Continuing Director #3: Lawyer (Departing Board)
This lawyer has served on our board and audit committee for many 
years, will retire in a few months, and plans to move to Florida. Because 
these talents and experience will no longer be available to our board, all 
experience and talent attributes for this director will be removed from our 
talent inventory appearing at Exhibit 7. 
4. Non-Continuing Director #4: Community Leader
This former college president has served on our board, 
compensation, and nominating and governance committees for many 
years. All stakeholders of this nonprofit seem to agree that this individual 
makes significant contributions of time and talent to our mission. 
5. Continuing Director #5: Religious Leader
This civic and religious leader has served on our board and audit 
committee for many years, is retiring and plans to move away from our 
geographic area to be in close proximity to children and grandchildren. 
Because these talents and experience will no longer be available to our 
board, all experience and talent attributes for this director will be removed 
from our talent inventory appearing at Exhibit 7. 
6. Continuing Director #6: Accountant
This director has many years of accounting and auditing experience, 
has served on our board and audit committee for many years, and will be 
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our single director having audit committee skills and experience. 
Accordingly, identifying and recruiting members for our audit committee 
will be a primary focus. 
7. Continuing Director #7: High School Counselor
This director continues to be a major contributor to the mission of 
this enterprise. She has served for many years on the compensation and 
nominating and governance committees. 
I. The Talent and Experience Inventory 
The narrative information for continuing directors presented above 
is depicted in the first few columns of Exhibit 7. As the nominating and 
governance committee and full board review and discuss the skills and 
experience needed for future board composition, the following thoughts 
and criteria emerge. First, this board will benefit from additional medical 
doctor and, in particular, drug treatment experience in our particular 
community. A consensus is reached that one or more candidates having 
social work experience in our community is a good idea. Audit committee 
experience, expertise, and cyber risk awareness is also needed. Continued 
discussion points to an awareness of a lack of social media sensitivity and 
marketing prowess within our nonprofit. A board member having these 
skills is desired. Our inner-city healthcare clinic seems to be living a very 
risky existence due to its present limited funding and sources of revenue. 
Accordingly, there is general agreement that director candidates having 
philanthropic experience, and personal contacts with likely donors are 
desired. 
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Exhibit 7 
Example of Inner-City Healthcare Clinic 
Board Talent Matrix Analysis 
1. Candidate A: Retired Audit Partner
Candidate A is an experienced audit partner at one of the world’s 
largest auditing service firms with considerable nonprofit audit 
experience. A financial expert, she also brings directorship experience; 
having served as audit chair on an industry board and as a member of 
compensation and governance and nominating committees. 
2. Candidate B: Retired Social Worker
This retired, former inner-city social worker brings considerable 
experience in our local community. Her vast experience with our 
neighborhoods, understanding of needed health-related services available 
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elsewhere throughout the community and existing relationships with 
providers—all appears very attractive. In addition, she has prior 
organizational governance experience. 
3. Candidate C: Financial Expert
She is a veteran audit partner at a major accounting firm and qualifies 
as a financial expert, as defined.167 She also brings prior audit and 
compensation experience gained while on the board of a major hospital 
management company. 
4. Candidate D: Attorney
She is an experienced attorney with many year’s experience 
representing corporate board clients in the discharge of their fiduciary 
duties. Our nonprofit views this expertise to be an absolute mission-
critical component to success, and these skills have been defined as 
particularly essential. 
5. Candidate E: Former Hospital CEO
This former hospital CEO had medical administrative experience 
about fifteen years ago and presided over a medical clinic outreach 
program affiliated with his hospital in another large city at that time. His 
hospital, medical and hospital liability, strategic planning, and prior 
executive committee experience is attractive. Also trained as a medical 
doctor, if nominated, this will be his first nonprofit board. 
6. Candidate F: Former CFO
She is a former CFO of a successful high-growth cardio-device 
manufacturer. She joined while the company was at venture-stage and 
served as CFO during the high growth phase. She qualifies as a financial 
expert, and has corporate governance experience gained by virtue of 
serving on two different company audit, compensation, and governance 
and nominating committees. She is now looking to give back by 
contributing her time and energies where most needed to her community. 
7. Candidate G: Attorney Wants to Make Pro Bono
Contribution
This lawyer is an attractive candidate by virtue of his serving 
previously as general counsel to a regional hospital system. Among his 
 167.  See Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies As An Audit Committee Financial Expert Under 
SEC Regulations and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 205 (2013). 
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peers, he appears highly regarded and knows the health delivery business, 
legal issues involved, and has executive and audit committee experience. 
8. Candidate H: Financial/Wealth Management Advisor
This individual has an MBA degree with a concentration in finance 
and investments and has worked for many years providing wealth 
management services. Having several members on a nonprofit’s board 
with this type of background is probably a good idea and may decrease 
the likelihood of experiencing a Bernie Madoff type of investment 
outcome. However, it is also a good idea to have an understanding up front 
that no funds of the nonprofit will be held at this director’s corporation or 
affiliated entity and that no commissions will accrue to any party in any 
way affiliated with any director. 
9. Candidates: Director of Numerous Nonprofits
Several board candidates bring prior philanthropic board service. 
Several are considered pillars of the community and highly active among 
many important community organizations. Their previous fundraising 
experience and knowledge of what works and who tends to have the 
capacity and desire to give financial support is clearly mission critical to 
our nonprofit’s future. 
J. The Analysis Process 
A director search will involve many considerations tailored to the 
unique requirements of the organization involved. The Nomination and 
Governance committee will likely have many director candidates with 
diverse talents to consider. Among nonprofit boards, it is often helpful to 
bring a discussion to the full board explaining the matrix analytical 
process employed and identifying those talents particularly being sought. 
This step may produce suggestions about individuals who might fill these 
vacancies in talent and experience. Hopefully, considerations presented 
here will provoke thoughtful discussions and better decisions. 
XII.CONCLUSION
It is every director’s legal duty of care that requires a careful, diligent 
approach to the effective recruitment and selection of new directors. 
Optimal board composition, that is, the best mix of director skills and 
experience will depend on many enterprise-specific variables. Some of 
the most important of these variables include: (1) enterprise lifecycle 
stage; (2) extent to which certain experiences and skills are mission 
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critical (detailed understanding of target culture, mission, stakeholder 
composition, and operational risk); (3) unique technology dependence 
(social media); and (4) need for capacity expansion (fundraising). A 
fundamental starting point for director recruitment and selection will ask, 
“What human qualities are desired for every board member?” Every board 
should agree on a clear statement of desired personal attributes of all board 
members to provide guidance to the nominating and governance 
committee as they search for director candidates. 
High standards of ethical behavior are an absolute must. The last 
decade has brought significant increases to the time demands placed on 
each director. Independence is now required for members of the audit, 
compensation, and nominating and governance committees in a for-profit 
setting where shareholders are protected by SEC regulations. Adoption of 
this reasoning by nonprofits seems prudent, and each board should adopt 
a clearly-written statement specifying what constitutes director 
independence. Ideal director candidates will possess a demonstrated 
soundness of judgment and effectiveness, as evidenced by a pro-active 
and results-oriented approach to problem solving. They will also have the 
ability to make independent, analytical inquiries about challenging 
organizational issues. Whatever the board has determined to be its major 
weakness or biggest challenge should probably be the area of focus for 
new board talent. At the fifty-thousand-foot level, the question that must 
be asked and answered by every board nominating committee is “What Is 
It That the Organization Does to Create Value? Do members of the board 
understand this value creation process – so they might govern it 
effectively?” 
After exploring current board membership strengths and 
weaknesses, various desirable skills and experience of director candidates 
are explored with a matrix methodology utilized to assist with analysis. 
Finally, the benefit of highly diverse approaches to problem solving and 
broadly different talents and experiences seems desirable when seeking to 
engineer the optimal people mix for productive small group decision 
making. The difficult monitoring of enterprise systems and a likely 
constant flow of future problems will require skillful navigation. It doesn’t 
seem healthy to want our decisions to be made by nine directors having 
the same narrow prisms in which they view the world. It is our hope that 
analysis considerations presented here will evoke thoughtful discussions 
and better decisions by nonprofit organizations. 
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